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FEASIBILITY OF RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION (RFID) 
AND ITEM UNIQUE IDENTIFICATION (IUID) IN THE MARINE 






The purpose of this MBA project is to determine how effective the use of RFID 
and IUID can be in Marine Corps armories based on operating procedures, support of key 
organizations within the Departments of the Navy and the Marine Corps, and current 
research.   This project’s first objective is to examine the involvement, progress and 
procedures of organizations that are involved in supporting and improving the Marine 
Corps’ armory processes.  The second objective is to explore the feasibility of 
implementing RFID and/or UID technology into the current Marine Corps small arms 
tracking system based on current research.  Feasibility and compatibility will be 
determined by examining the existing organizations, current business processes and 
information technology systems.  The third objective is to examine the current research 
about the use of RFID and UID technology with small arms.  The final objective is to 
provide recommendations for implementation of these technologies in the Marine Corps 
armory system. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The current Marine Corps armory inventory system and procedures are manually 
intensive.  Managers at the unit level believe that Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) 
and Unique Identification (UID) can improve supply chain management and inventory 
control of armory assets.  The Marine Corps needs to adopt better technology to improve 
issuing, receiving and inventory processing within their armories.  UID and RFID 
technology are possible options that can improve the Marine Corps armory processes.  
The capabilities of both technologies require analysis to determine feasibility before 
choosing either of them.  The Department of Defense (DoD) requirements, organizations 
and military systems affect the success of implementing RFID and UID tags within 
Marine Corps armories, so these factors require examination. 
In 2003, the DoD mandated that RFID tag usage is required from all 43,000 of 
their suppliers, with the expectation that RFID tags is to be implemented by 2008.  In the 
same year, the DoD mandated that UID tags be placed on new equipment, major 
modifications and reprocurement of equipment/spares.  This was done to better track 
worldwide military assets and their value.  UID was designed to improve item lifecycle 
management, accountability, asset visibility, data quality and interoperability. 
Currently Marine Corps armories suffer from long processing times in the 
inventory and issue of assets.  The accuracy of records and transactions are affected by 
human error during transcription.  The actions enacted on armory assets effects numerous 
logistic sections throughout the Marine Corps. 
RFID or UID tags can be attached to small arms weapons in Marine Corps 
armories.  Once attached, a RFID or UID reader can be used to quickly inventory the 
weapons.  The use of RFID and/or UID tags, along with a reader, can significantly reduce 
the time required for an inventory.  The middleware with which the reader communicates 
can update current Marine Corps inventory systems as well as the Navy Warfare Surface 
Center (NWSC) Crane online report system.  However, certain conditions may interfere  
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with the functionality of either technology.  Therefore, before choosing an RFID or UID 
system, an organization must identify their needs and analyze various programs and 
directives. 
This study attempts to utilize existing studies, site visits, comparative analysis and 
a survey in order to determine if and how the use of RFID and UID tags can be used to 
smooth the inventory process of small arm assets in Marine Corps armories. 
Existing studies consisting of literature reviews, books, magazine articles and 
military tests were used to secure useful information on the subject matter.  The existing 
studies cover the basic uses and description of RFID and UID technology.  Previous tests 
and evaluations of RFID and UID tags were examined to provide further information 
about each product’s capabilities.  In addition, DoD policy and mandates were reviewed 
regarding implementation of RFID and UID technology.  Careful attention was paid to 
the format of each study in order to verify the legitimacy of their findings and 
conclusions. 
Throughout the thesis, information from existing DoD, Navy and Marine Corps 
systems and concepts was gathered to compare and analyze the effectiveness of RFID 
and UID in Marine Corps armories.  The Joint Asset Maintenance Integrated Support 
System (JAMISS) was reviewed as a possible solution to the integration of UID or RFID 
in Marine Corps armories.  The DoD Concept of Operations for UID was studied to 
compare its’ vision to the actual implementation of UID in the Marine Corps.  Finally, a 
report from the Government Accounting Office (GAO) and capability information 
pertaining to the future Marine Corps logistics platform Global Combat Support System 
Marine Corps (GCSS-MC) is used to review the impact of time on the implementation of 
UID in the Marine Corps. 
Several site visits were conducted at key military installations.  These visits were 
conducted to gain a better understanding of agency procedures and to gather information 
on the implementation of RFID and UID tags in the Marine Corps.  NWSC Crane was 
visited in order to review the process of the Crane Report and obtain information on their 
data processing system.  LOGCOM, Albany was visited to review the process flow of 
 3
armory assets from weapon manufactures to the Marine Corps and gain insight on the 
usage of UID and/or RFID tags at LOGCOM.  Finally, Marine Corps Base Camp 
Pendleton was visited to issue surveys pertaining to the usage and durability of UID tag 
markings on small arm assets.   
The goal of the thesis is to determine if UID tags is an effective application with 
current systems to improve the inventory and issuing processes of Marine Corps 
armories. The thesis will also compare RFID and UID tags in order to establish which 
product is more suitable to improve the processes with Marine Corps armories.  Lastly, 
the thesis team hopes to offer recommendations that will assist in the application of 
products that will improve the inventory and issuing processes in Marine Corps armories. 
The thesis is divided into chapters that develop the examination of RFID and UID 
technology and their application within Marine Corps armories.  Chapter II discusses the 
Marine Corps armory and technology review, which includes a description of the 
different inventory processes required of Marine Corps armories.  Additionally, the 
chapter also includes a history, components, uses, benefits and challenges of UID and 
RFID tags.  Chapter III reviews the organizations, systems and operations of the DoD, 
Navy and Marine Corps associated with weapon usage and tracking within the Marine 
Corps.  Chapter IV is a review and analysis of existing studies pertaining to RFID and 
UID testing.  Chapter V is an assessment of current Item Unique Identification (IUID) 
implantation efforts in the DoD and additionally reviews and analyzes the current 
processes and concepts within the DoD, Marine Corps and Navy.  Chapter VI consists of 
an analysis of RFID vs. IUID, operation availability and a questionnaire presented to 
random armories located on Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton.  In Chapter VII, the 
final chapter, recommendations are presented for various organizations within the Marine 
Corps on ways to improve the application of UID and/or RFID. 
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II. MARINE CORPS ARMORY AND TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 
The small arms armories throughout the Marine Corps have established 
procedures to maintain accountability of their assets.  These procedures have remained 
the same throughout the years; many of them are transcribed by hand and are labor 
intensive.  For these reasons, the processes require a considerable amount of time to 
complete.  The next sections cover the history of RFID, Marine Corps small arms 
inventorying process, reporting procedures and a basic introduction to RFID and UID 
technology. 
A. MARINE CORPS ARMORY INVENTORY PROCESSES 
The conventional inventory process within Marine Corps armories needs to be 
updated.  The use of RFID and UID technology has the potential to improve this process.  
RFID is a system of tags and antennas that can be used to track and record location of 
assets, whereas UID are tags that contain static information about the item that can be 
used to provide Total Asset Visibility (TAV) and real-time access to information 
pertaining to current military assets.  Organizations within Marine Corps and the 
Department of the Navy are testing both of these technologies, conducting research, and 
lobbying for programs to improve inventory procedures.  However, the organizations do 
not appear to be communicating or combining their efforts.  The inventory process for a 
Marine Corps armory can be broken down into three methods: daily, monthly, and annual 
inventory process. 
1. Daily Inventory Process 
The Marine Corps has many small arm weapons armories that contain weapons of 
varying types that require inventory on a daily, monthly, and annual basis.  A substantial 
amount of time and manpower is required to inventory these assets.  Each day, an 
armorer counts all the weapons to ensure that all of them are properly accounted for by 
the armory, no matter where the weapon might be located or whom it is issued.  Any 
armorer within the armory can perform the daily inventory process.  This inventory 
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process is verified against the known on-hand quantity.  If there is a discrepancy, it is 
immediately checked against any weapon issuing documentation.  If an asset cannot be 
found, the chain of command is notified and all training is halted to conduct a search for 
the weapon. 
2. Monthly Inventory Process 
Each month, a Staff Non-commissioned Officer (SNCO) is selected to conduct an 
inventory of all the weapons by serial number within the armory.  This process is 
described below and shown in Figure 1.  It may take between several hours and several 
weeks, depending on the number of weapons within the armory.  The SNCO is provided 
with a copy of the Consolidated Memorandum of Receipts (CMR) from the unit’s supply 
section. The CMR lists each weapon by item description or nomenclature, quantity, and 
serial number.  During the inventory, the SNCO usually selects a junior Marine to assist 
him or her.  The junior Marine goes from weapon to weapon reading the serial number, 
which the SNCO annotates in the CMR.  If there are any changes, the SNCO annotates 
them on the CMR.  Once the SNCO completes the inventory, he or she compiles the 
results and submits them to the unit’s supply section via the Logistics Officer.  The 
supply section then compares the results of the current inventory to the one conducted 
during the previous month, to ensure that supply records reflect the inventory results.  If 
the records do not match, a reconciliation is conducted to discover the reason.  The 
supply section then makes the necessary changes to the CMR, and a cover letter 




Figure 1. Marine Corps Armory Monthly Inventory Process  
(From NSA) 
 
This process requires recruiting an SNCO, who has a primary job elsewhere, to 
step away from that job and conduct the inventory.  While that SNCO is away, the 
capacity of his or her primary section is reduced.  The primary section could be an 
Infantry company, Administrative section, Communication section or any other section 
(except the Supply section because it would be a conflict of interest).  The use of RFID 
and/or UID tags could reduce the time required to conduct an inventory, and a great 
portion of that capacity could be returned to the primary section. 
3. Annual Inventory Process 
On an annual basis, the Supply section receives a consolidated inventory list of 
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Crane report.  On receipt of this report, the unit must review and reconcile the Crane 
report against the CMR to ensure accountability.  It does not require a physical inventory 
as is required by the monthly armory inventory.  The Crane report needs to be signed by 
the unit’s Commanding Officer, and should be returned to the NWSC Crane within 45 
days with any changes and supporting documentation, as seen in Figure 2. 
Throughout the year, the unit is required to submit weapons transfers and serial 
number and quantity changes to NWSC Crane.  These changes are submitted via fax or 
by scanned documentation from each unit that has an armory within the Marine Corps.  
Once NWSC Crane receives the documentation, it must be manually entered into the 
database to update the system.  Changes submitted to NWSC Crane may not be reflected 
in their database online for months, which would directly result in the individual units 
receiving their Crane report with outdated serial numbers and quantities.  If the report 
contains incorrect information, the unit must contact NWSC Crane to verify if the 
changes were initially received.  If they were received, the unit must wait until NWSC 
Crane processes the changes.  If NWSC Crane did not receive the initial changes, the unit 
must resubmit them.  Implementing an automated RFID/UID inventory system at the unit 
level to automatically update the database could significantly reduce the processing time 
at NWSC Crane. 
 
 
Figure 2. Marine Corps Armory Annual Inventory Process 
 
B. RFID 
RFID is considered part of Automatic Identification (Auto ID) technologies.  An 
RFID tag is an item that transmits the identity of an object (and its unique serial number) 
using radio waves.  Barcodes, optical character readers, and retinal scans are also part of 
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a long list of Auto ID.  Many businesses have sought these technologies to reduce the 
time and labor required to input data and to improve data accuracy (Bhuptani & 
Moradpour, 2005).  In the following sections the thesis group will discuss the history of 
RFID, RFID system components, uses for RFID, and the benefits and challenges of 
RFID. 
1. History of RFID 
The origin of RFID can be traced to World War II.  The Americans, British, 
Japanese, and Germans were using Radio Detection and Ranging (RADAR) to search for 
approaching aircraft.  The problem with RADAR was that there was no way to identify 
which aircraft belonged to which country.  The British quickly solved this problem when 
British scientist Watson-Watt designed the Identify Friend or Foe (IFF) system by 
allowing RADAR to pick up a transponder signal located on the aircraft (Landt, 2001).  
In the 1950s and 1960s, passive RFID technology continued to grow radio transmission 
systems.  In the 1960s, Electronic Article Surveillance (EAS) or “1-bit” tags were 
developed as an anti-theft device.  EAS proved to be the first commercial application of 
RFID use  (Landt, 2001).  In the 1970s, RFID was developed for animal tracking, vehicle 
tracking and factory automation.  In the 1980s, RFID companies began to grow due to  
the increase in commercial applications of the technology.  Toll roads is one commercial 
application of RFID that was used in Europe and in the United States.  In the 1990s, 
RFID began to be used in applications such as ski passes and vehicle access.  In the 
northeastern United States, the E-Z Pass system was developed for drivers to drive at 
normal speeds through a toll plaza and be billed later (Landt, 2001).  Today’s RFID 
technology can be seen in everyday applications and in almost every small portable 
electronic device.  Displayed in Figure 3 are systems, devices and interfaces that have 





Figure 3. Active RFID Systems, Interfaces and Devices 
(Harrop, 2006) 
2. RFID System Components  
RFID systems consist of two parts: the RFID tag and reader.  The RFID tag 
carries information about the object and is located on the object to be identified.  The 
RFID reader scans the RFID tag for the encoded information. The RFID reader interprets 
the information and, if needed, forwards it to a computer system (Finkenzeller, 2003).  
Most RFID tags consist of a microchip attached to a radio antenna. 
a. RFID Tag 
The RFID tag is a device attached to an item that information can be 
maintained on/retrieved from or tracked by.  The RFID tag can be of various designs, 
materials, and/or sizes and hold a variable amount of information.  Each tag is composed  
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of three parts: the antenna, the microchip and the casing.  There are several different 
antennas within an RFID system.  There is an antenna located on the RFID tag, as 





Figure 4 RFID tag 




Figure 5. RFID tag 
From (Stamatiou, 2007) 
 
Currently, RFID tags are either active, semi-passive or passive.  Active 
tags contain their own power source in the form of a battery.  That power source allows 
the tag to have a longer read-range, better accuracy, and diverse information exchange, as 
shown in Table 1.  The power onboard active tags allow them to transfer information 
(without a RFID reader to initiate their power).  Due to the battery, active tags cost more 
than passive tags.  Semi-passive tags have a small onboard battery.  These tags cannot 






batteries and therefore require a RFID reader to initiate their power in order to obtain and 
transfer information (Bhuptani & Moradpour, 2005). 
 
Table 1. Tag Types Passive, Semi-Passive and Active 
From (Bhuptani & Moradpour, 2005, 42) 
 
Some RFID tags have an Integrated Circuit (IC).  The IC is a 
microprocessor chip that stores information.  When a tag is initiated, it can then perform 
some of the following tasks based on the way it is made (Bhuptani & Moradpour, 2005). 
a. Write Once, Read Many (WORM) – The information inscribed on 
the tag is inscribed in the tag once with the capability of being read 
many times.  
b. Read Only (RO) – The RFID tag can only be read, nothing can be 
written to the tag. 
c. Read, Write (RW) – This tag can have information both written to 
the tag and read from the tag multiple times. 
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Tags typically have many different memory sizes, varying from 1 bit to 
several hundred bits.  Some microchips are able to store up to 2 kilobytes of data.  The 
chips usually contain information such as type of product, date of shipment, date of 
manufacture, destination, sell-by date, and expiration date.  Tags containing 1-bit 
memory cards have no unique identifier, which only make their presence known when 
initiated by a RFID reader.  The memory on tags is usually extended from 16 bit to 
several hundred bits.  The amount of memory used or available on a tag is usually 
determined by the application being used (Bhuptani & Moradpour, 2005).  A RFID tag 
used for inventory purposes would require less memory than an RFID tag which is 
designed to record, track and analyze information.  
Different RFID tags have the capability to measure, monitor, and save 
information about their environments.  RFID tags have the capability to create routine 
processes and to reduce errors by limiting human intervention.  They can also transfer 
information quickly and continually track the status of items. 
b. RFID Readers 
A RFID reader retrieves and processes information from the RFID tag.  
RFID readers typically contain a module (transmitter and receiver), a control unit and a 
coupling element (antenna).  The RFID reader has three main functions: energizing, 
demodulating and decoding.  RFID readers send radio frequencies to tags.  For passive 
tags, the radio frequency is used to energize the passive tag so it can respond back to the 
RFID reader.  Some RFID readers also have the ability to write information to tags.  In 
addition, RFID readers can be fitted with an additional interface that converts the radio 
waves returned from the RFID tag into a form that can then be passed on to another 
system, such as a computer or any programmable logic controller.  Anti-Collision 
algorithms permit the simultaneous reading of large numbers of tagged objects, while 
ensuring that each tag is read only once (Head, 2008).  RFID readers are usually made in 
mobile handheld designs (Figure 6), but can also be stationary portals (Figure 7).  Mobile 
readers are typically used in inventory processes to scan tagged items.  Stationary readers 
are used to scan mobile items passing by (Obellos, Colleran, & Lookabill, 2007).  A good 
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example of this is a warehouse processing pallets as they are being moved or cars passing 
through a tollbooth.  Individual RFID readers can be mounted on poles or structures 
(Figure 8) to track or record assets with RFID tags (Figure 9) such as the RFID systems 
found at tollbooths. 
 
Figure 6.  Portable RFID Reader 




Figure 7. Stationary Motorola RFID Reader 




Figure 8. Pole Type RFID Reader  




Figure 9. Vehicle Window RFID Tag  
From (Cascadia Prospectus, 2008) 
 
3. Uses for RFID  
Modern technology has allowed for many advances in the field of electronics.  In 
the past 20 years, RFID technology has had many advances as well.  Many of the items 
that we use everyday are RFID enhanced but are unknown to the user.  RFID technology 
has improved many of today’s business applications through improved authentication, 
access control, people monitoring, environmental sensing and monitoring, convenience, 
process efficiency, and applications in supply chain management. 
a. Authenticate 
RFID tags can be embedded in or placed on people, products, equipment, 
and merchandise to confirm authenticity.  This procedure contributes to reduce 
counterfeiting of products, reduced impersonation and increased security.  In addition, the 
implementation of RFID technology for authentication allows for easier and quicker 
movement of items and people (Finkenzeller, 2003). 
b. Access Control 
RFID tags can be placed in carriers such as key chains and cards to 
provide or deny access to secure areas such as office spaces and storerooms.  This use of 
RFID tags is an inexpensive way to authenticate, grant, track, and prevent access to key 
areas.  The use of RFID technology can potentially replace personnel who control access 
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to areas; sense and monitor environments; track and trace items and people; and assist in 
industrial automation and supply chain integration (Finkenzeller, 2003). 
c. People Monitoring 
RFID tags can be used to track people (especially children and the elderly) 
for safety, security, and health reasons.  When used as a monitoring device, RFID 
technology can bring peace of mind and prevent worry.  In addition, it can prevent 
security violations and mishaps (Finkenzeller, 2003). 
d. Environment Sensing and Monitoring 
RFID tags can sense condition changes such as temperature and pressure.  
Once the condition change happens, the RFID tag can record the time of the change.  The 
capability can be most valuable in the supply chain when the exact time items are shipped 
and their condition level needs to be maintained to sustain the quality of the product 
(Finkenzeller, 2003). 
e. Convenience 
In many cases, RFID tags allow for a more efficient process, which could 
lead to reduced cost and prevent redundancy.  Such products as payment cards allow 
customers to conveniently and quickly pay for services and products.  RFID-enabled key 
chains and cards allow customers to automatically create a billing transaction when 
passing through tollbooths or obtaining fuel (Finkenzeller, 2003). 
f. Process Efficiency 
RFID systems reduce data entry and transcription errors with the use of a 
reader.  Scanning with a reader enables time reduction in processes.  These improvements 
allow for increased efficiency and a smoother process. 
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g. Applications in Supply Chain Management 
Research in the Marine Corps and the other military services within the 
DoD study RFID applications to increase TAV and inventory control.  The DoD has seen 
how RFID technology is used in the business world and how it has helped to streamline 
the biggest retail businesses such as Wal-Mart, Target, and Home Depot.  RFID 
technology is currently used in supply chain management in the areas of TAV and 
inventory control. 
Wal-Mart has become the dominant retail leader by using RFID tags for 
pallet tracking in their distribution centers.  In June of 2003, Wal-Mart mandated that 
their top 100 suppliers put RFID tags on cases and pallets, later expanding to include 
another 500 suppliers (Fish & Forrest, 2007). Starting in October 2008, Wal-Mart’s 
distribution center in Dallas, Texas, started levying fines to suppliers that not comply 
with their mandate.  The fines consist of a $2.00 charge for each pallet not having an 
RFID tag (Blanchard, 2008).  Wal-Mart believes RFID usage will provide asset visibility 
and reduce stockouts that prevent increased sales from their suppliers. 
It is expected that the use of RFID technology within the military can 
provide better asset tracking, improve operations efficiency in acquiring material from 
suppliers and in delivering to units in the field (Business Wire, 2005).  The military 
learned an important lesson during Operation Desert Storm from having lost and 
misplaced supplies, which added to the total cost of the war.  In the following ten years, 
the DoD spent an estimated 100 million dollars implementing RFID technology (Gilbert, 
2004).  Like Wal-Mart, the DoD has also mandated, in 2003, that defense suppliers use 
RFID technology.  The DoD initially required the use of RFID tags for all 43,000 
suppliers, but has since relaxed its policy due to the high cost of RFID systems and the 
emergence of comparative technologies. 
Within the supply chain of the Marine Corps, RFID tags are currently 
being used by the Transportation Management Office (TMO) and Supported Activities 
Supply System Management Unit (SMU).  RFID tags are used to improve asset visibility 
by tracking the location of packages transported to units by the TMO and SMU.  The 
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Navy also uses RFID technology to improve asset visibility by placing RFID tags on 
pallets for inventory control and item tracking.  Additionally, troops in Iraq are using 
RFID tags on pallets and vehicles.  RFID readers are set up at a distribution center in 
Kuwait, at the Iraq-Kuwaiti border and at checkpoints along the main roadways into Iraq.  
When trucks pass the readers, the location of the goods that are transported is updated in 
the US Department of Defense's In Transit Visibility network database.  This enables 
commanders on the ground to see the precise location of replenishments needed to 
sustain operations (Roberti, 2005). 
4. Benefits and Challenges for RFID 
Supply-chain applications of RFID are beneficial to both the DOD and suppliers.  
RFID technology has enabled the recording of material transfer and enhanced TAV.  In 
the limited implementations of RFID to date, the DoD has seen benefits in inventory 
management, operational improvements, and asset tracking, as listed below.   
Supplier Benefits:  
• Improved planning  
• Faster demand responses  
• Reduced Bull Whip Effect  
• Streamlined Business Processes  
• Improved efficiency in the recall of defective items  
• Increased ability to ensure that product(s) remain stocked on DoD 
shelves  
• Faster receipt of payments for supplied goods  
 
 
DoD Benefits:  
• Improved inventory management  
• Improved labor productivity  
• Elimination of duplicate orders  
• Replacement of manual procedures  
• Automated receipt and acceptance  
• Improved inventory and shipment visibility and management  
• Reduced shrinkage  
• Enhanced business processes within the DoD  
• Improved asset tracking  
(DoD, 2007)  
 19
The benefits of RFID have been highly discussed; however, recent studies are 
showing negative aspects and concerns regarding costs of RFID, lack of identification 
standards and training, degraded performance and privacy issues (Jones, Wyld, & 
Trotten, 2005).  The costs of an RFID system includes the costs for the RFID tags, 
software, additional hardware, process reengineering, solution testing, implementation 
and maintenance updates (Maloni & DeWolf, 2006). When the DoD issued the RFID 
policy, it was recommended that the training and implementation be standardized 
amongst the various branches in the military.  Currently, the standard for RFID training 
and, the DoD Logistics (LOG)-Automatic Information Technology (AIT) training, have 
not been developed.  In the interim, each branch within the military is developing their 
own separate training plans.  This separation in training can lead to the different branches 
duplicating efforts to accomplish the same goal.  If each branch creates its own training 
plan, the total cost of implementing the RFID program is increased.  In addition, the lack 
of communication between the military services involving the application of RFID 
systems could multiply errors.  This may lead to the degradation and abandonment of 
RFID systems. 
The performance of RFID tags can be degraded when placed on metallic objects, 
in the vicinity of water and in inappropriate temperature conditions.  One of the many 
problems that RFID readers have is their vulnerability to outside RFID readers.  An 
outside RFID reader can be described as one not belonging to the current system.  Users 
of these outside readers have the potential ability to hack in and retrieve valued 
information.  Therefore, outside RFID readers have the potential to be used as a weapon 
against other RFID systems.  An outside RFID reader can be used to read data from an 
RFID tag, and that information can be used for purposes that may threaten the system.  In 
a study documented in Popular Mechanics magazine, researchers were able to use off-
the-shelf scanners to read account numbers and cardholder names off RFID credit cards.  
Researchers at the University of Massachusetts were able to construct scanners capable of 
skimming the cardholders name and card number from a variety of first-generation RFID 
credit cards.  They then found a way to transmit that data back to a card reader, tricking it 
into accepting a purchase (Johnson, 2007). 
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C. UID AND IUID  
UID can be described as a system of marking items with unique-item identifiers 
that have machine-readable data elements that can distinguish an asset from all other 
items.  UID and Item Unique Identifier (IUID) are often mistakenly interchanged with 
one another because they are similar looking acronyms.  The following sections 
pertaining to the history, types, uses, benefits and challenges, registry, and lifecycle of 
UID will clearly distinguish UID from IUID. 
1. History of UID 
The origin of UID started with the development of the barcode in 1948.  A 
graduate student, Bernard Silver of Drexel Institute of Technology in Philadelphia, asked 
Norman Woodland from IBM to develop a system to automatically read product 
information during checkout.  The two eventually created a device that they patented as 
“Classifying Apparatus and Method.”  This helped create the first barcode, which was a 
“bull’s eye” symbol, made up of a series of concentric circles (Romando, 2006).  
Eventually, the barcode was commercialized in 1967 by RCA implementing a scanner 
system in the Kroger stores in Cincinnati, OH. 
The barcode evolved over the following 30 to 40 years from the grocery industry 
to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).  In 1990, NASA 
collaborated with the bar coding industry to develop a new type of barcode called the 
two-dimensional (2D) data matrix.  The 2D data matrix allowed more data to be placed 
within the barcode, giving way to the term “unique identification” (Secretary of Defense, 
2005).  Original barcodes contained only 10 numeric characters.  They have since 
changed to include 249 alphanumeric characters, which offer the potential for increased 
information handling.  Table 2 shows the evolution of the barcode and the data elements 
that are contained in each type. 
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Table 2. Types of Barcodes 
From (Allen, 2008) 
 








These are conventional one-dimensional barcodes. 
Both barcodes to the left contain 10 data 
characters, which can encode both numeric and 
alphanumeric data. However, the alpha characters 
are single case (usually defined as upper case). If 
lower case characters are required, then 'Full 
ASCII Code 39' must be used, and the barcode 
increases in size as shown in the second example.  
 
10 
This one-dimensional barcode can encode data 
characters in about half the space available. 
However, the symbology cannot encode alphabetic 






Code 128 barcodes can encode alphanumeric 
characters. The numeric characters can be encoded 
in compact form.  However, if alpha characters are 
included in the barcode, its size increases by about 
50%.  Code 128 is about the best that can be 
achieved with one-dimensional barcodes.  
 
10 
This two-dimensional barcode contains 10 
alphanumeric characters.  With this number of 
data characters, there is no advantage over 
conventional barcodes.  
 
62 
This two-dimensional barcode contains 62 
alphanumeric characters.  This is much more than 
can be achieved with a conventional barcode 
while retaining a manageable barcode size.   
 
249 
This two-dimensional barcode contains 249 
alphanumeric characters.  This example shows the 
maximum amount of information that can be 





2. Creating an IUID 
A UID is a unique identification used for tracking and identification of items.  
The design of a UID allows it to store information similar to a barcode.  As shown in 
Table 2, the 2D matrix design of a UID allows it to hold more information than a 
barcode.  Changes can be made to a UID to make it different and unique from other UIDs 
to conform to DoD requirements.  The DoD also requires that all DoD UID information 
be placed within a DoD UID Registry.  This will prevent items within the DoD from 
having the same UID marking regardless of the manufacturer. 
UIDs used by the DoD are called IUIDs.  These are UIDs that have Unique Item 
Identifier (UII) information encoded into a 2D data matrix.  A 2D data matrix is a data 
encoding design that is different from other 2D UID marking designs, as shown in Figure 
10.  A Unique Item Identifier (UII) consists of a format code, data identifiers, an 
enterprise identifier, a part number and a serial number that creates a UII that is unique 
across the DoD.  These UII details are described in Figure 11.  Once the UII information 
is created and encoded within the 2D matrix, it becomes an IUID. 
 
                 
2D Data matrix           PDF417            Maxi code          QR code           Aztec 
 
Figure 10. 2D Barcodes 




Figure 11. Unique Item Identifier 
From (MacDougall, 2007) 
 
The DoD plans to facilitate item tracking with the use of IUID.  The IUID will 
provide reliable and accurate information for management, financial, accountability and 
asset management purposes.  IUID are used for lifecycle data visibility on any of the 
following items: assets with serial numbers, worth upwards of $5,000, mission essential, 
considered controlled inventory, and/or need permanent identification. The complete 
decision tree to determine if an item requires IUID marking is shown in Figure 12. 
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Figure 12. IUID Decision Tree 
From (Secretary of Defense, 2006) 
a. UII Design 
Manufacturers are now required by the DoD to mark assets identified in 
Figure 12 with an IUID.  To do this process, many manufacturers contract an enterprise 
agency that is responsible for assigning the UIIs.  UII is the name for the type of data 
coded into the IUID.  The enterprise identifier is unique.  For items that are serialized, 
meaning each consecutive item that is produced is assigned the next unique serial number 
in a sequence, the UII data set includes the data elements of the enterprise identifier and 
the unique serial number.  This is known as Construct 1.  A construct is a set of rules for 
how the UII within the IUID data is derived.  For items that are serialized within the part 
type, lot or batch number, the UII data set includes the enterprise identifier; the original 
part, lot or batch number; and the serial number.  This is known as Construct 2.  Below 
are samples of Construct 1 and 2.  Construct 1 is used if the serial number is unique 
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within the enterprise identifier.  Construct 2 is used if the serial number in not unique 
within the enterprise identifier but is unique within the part number (DoD, 2005).  
Construct 1 UII 
 
OCVA9  513B36452 
(Enterprise Identifier)     (Serial Number) 
 
 
Construct 2 UII 
 
OCVA9 1234 513B36452 
(Enterprise Identifier) (Original Part Number) (Serial Number) 
 
The UII must also include semantics for formatting, as shown in Figure 
12, from the International Standards Organization/International Electrotechnical 
Commission (ISO/IEC) 15434. “G/S” as seen in figure 11, refers to the “Group 
Separator” character in the American Standard Code for Information Interchange (ASCII) 
character set.  It is a non-printable character.  “R/S EOT” as seen in figure 11, refers to 
the “End of Transmission” character in the ASCII character set.  It is a non-printable 
character.  The construct can have no more that 50 characters.  Those characters can be 
capital letters A through Z, numbers 1 to 9, forward slash (/) and hyphen (-).  Lowercase 
letters, periods and asterisks cannot be used.  
b. Types of  IUID Labels 
Many different types of IUID labels exist.  The IUID marking can come in 
different sizes and formats (Figure 13).  It can be embedded in the asset’s material with 
dot peen and laser etching.  It can also be applied to the surface of the asset by chemical 
etching, ink jet or adhesive tape.  IUID tags are capable of storing small to large amounts 
of information.  The information remains unchanged (i.e., static) within the tag once the 
tag is produced.  The layout and type of a UID determines how well it can be read and 
how durable it will be.  Once the IUID is created, it must be added to the UID registry 




Dot Peen Chemical Etch Ink Jet Laser Etch TESA Tape 
Figure 13. Types of IUID 
From (MacDougall, 2007) 
 
3. Uses for UID 
UIDs provide a simple and inexpensive method of encoding text information that 
is easily read by inexpensive electronic readers.  UIDs also allows data to be collected 
rapidly and with accuracy. 
The primary purpose of a UID is to label the item with a unique number or 
character string.  UIDs are used with a database application in which the data encoded in 
the barcodes is used as an index to a record in the database that contains more detailed 
information about the item that is being scanned.  This makes UIDs useful for a variety of 
applications.  For example, when a checkout clerk scans a barcode UID on a product in a 
grocery store, the barcode data is fed into a computer that looks up the information in a 
central database and returns more detailed information about the item that was scanned, 
including, possibly, a description of the item and a price.  By using barcodes, the grocery 
store does not need to put a price tag on each item in the store, and they can change the 
price for a particular item by modifying a single entry in the central database.  They can 
also track how much of a product is currently in stock so that they know when to re-order 
more of each item as the number of items in stock falls (TAL tech, 2005). 
UIDs can also be used to improve any processes requiring the inputting of data.  
UIDs provide a quick and error-free means for inputting the data into an application 
running on a computer.  Because UIDs are 2D barcodes, they are capable of containing 
significantly more data than linear barcodes.  By using UID, the potential for human error 
from manual data input is significantly reduced.  Another application for UID is for 
inputting data without typing or transcribing.  For example, one could encode information 
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about a person in a barcode on an ID badge and then scan the ID card to input the 
person’s information into a computer program instead of typing the information.  UID is 
used to reduce time and errors in various business industries.  In retail, UIDs can identify 
what the product is.  In the shipping industry, UIDs are used to give information about 
the contents of packages.  In the future, UID is expected to supply production details, 
such as batch number and use-by date. 
4. Benefits and Challenges of UID 
The DoD has seen the benefits UID presents in TAV and lifecycle management.  
Having been plagued by the inability to see assets as they are flown into theater and are 
in storage.  In addition, when assets are not visible, they are difficult to manage.  As 
discovered in Operation Desert Storm, when assets are lost, duplicate orders are made.  
This duplication of ordering assets directly increased the costs associated with the 
operation and has a direct impact on the funds that are available in the DoD budget.  The 
DoD has chosen to use UID for asset tracking.  The use of UID is capable reducing these 
costs and providing other benefits such as: 
• Item visibility regardless of platform 
• Lower item-management costs 
• Provide line item data for top level logistics and engineering analysis 
• Accurate sources for property and equipment valuation and accountability 
• Improved access to historical data for use during systems design and   
throughout the life of an item 
• Reduced workforce burden through increased productivity and efficiency 
• Better item intelligence for warfighters for operation planning 
• Lower lifecycle costs 
• Improved inventory accuracy 
There are also challenges associated with using UID.  The type of UID marking, 
the material to be marked, and the environment are variables that need to be considered 
when implementing UID markings.  Other potential challenges that occur when using 
UID marking are as follows: 
• The UID mark is only durable if protected. 
• Many marks do not perform well with liquids and abrasives. 
• Some marks may not survive repair processes. 
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• Various surfaces may interfere with the adhesiveness of the UID. 
• The cost of labeling equipment may vary with the type of UID marking. 
• Certain UID markings require increased safety and training requirements. 
• Some UID markings may require specialty tools that will increase total 
costs. 
5. UID Registry 
The DoD UID Registry assists the DoD with asset visibility across the services.  
The goal of this registry is to be a single-point system and to reduce redundancy of 
multiple, separate systems.  All DoD acquisitioned items that meet certain specifications 
are entered into the DoD UID Registry.  Contractors and/or suppliers enter information 
on new assets, while individual branches of the DoD enter information on legacy assets.  
The requirements stipulated in the contract written by the DoD are logistically difficult 
for many contractors and suppliers.  Each supplier or contractor must input all the 
required information into the DoD UID Registry in order to comply with the DoD 
mandate.  The required information in the registry is referred to as pedigree information 
and includes:  
• Item Description, UID (consisting of concatenated DoD UII, or DoD-
recognized UID equivalent) 
•  UII type, issuing agency code (if DoD UII is used) 
•  Enterprise identifier (if DoD UII is used)  
• Original part number  
• Serial number  
• Unit of measure  
• Government’s unit acquisition cost 
• Ship-to code  
• Contractor’s Commercial and Government Entity (CAGE) code or data 
universal numbering system (DUNS) number  
• Contract number  
• Contract line, sub line, or exhibit line item number 
• Acceptance code and shipment date 
The intent of the registry is to make it easy for the DoD to access the necessary 
and relevant information about DoD-procured items.  The acquisition, repair, and 
deployment of registered items are expected to be faster and more efficient for the DoD 
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when using UID.  In addition, the DoD UID Registry helps the DoD accomplish higher 
states of operational readiness and facilitates checking the status of assets in theater and 
in storage.  Commanders and decision makers should be able to use the registry to obtain 
information on an asset.  Links to organic service systems, through Global Combat 
Support System (GCSS) (Figure 14.); will allow visibility to dynamic information about 
a particular asset.  The DOD UID Registry will make information readily available to top 
level decision makers. 
 
Figure 14. IUID Registry Process 
6. UID Life Cycle 
The goal of the implementation of IUID systems within the DoD is to allow each 
asset to be tracked throughout its life.  Current DoD contracts are required to include the 
requirement for parts-markings to include UII imbedded information for all items that 
require unique identification to be identified as outlined in the DoD IUID Mandate.  The 
DoD IUID Mandate establishes the decision rules for determining if an item needs to be 
marked with IUID, as was shown in Figure 12.  Based on this information, DoD suppliers 
assign and apply UII data elements, and ensure uniqueness of the component data 
elements.  The functional stakeholders can then update the UII information in the UID 















































Once the asset has met its useful lifecycle, it is disposed of.  The DoD then records the 
termination of the UII.  The UII is still kept on the asset to ensure that the asset does not 









III. ORGANIZATIONS, SYSTEMS AND OPERATIONS  
Many organizations within the DoD, Navy and Marine Corps are involved in the 
supply and management of weapons (Figure 15).  Each organization affects the process in 
a different way.  We examine these organizations to see how well they are suited to 
support the implementation of RFID and/or IUID in Marine Corps armories. 
 
 






















In July 2004, The Secretary of the Defense issued a policy regarding RFID that 
states:  
New solicitations for materiel issued after October 1, 2004, for delivery 
after January 1, 2005, will contain a requirement for passive RFID tagging 
at the case (exterior container within a palletized unit load or shipping 
container), pallet (palletized unit load), and the UID item packaging level 
of shipment in accordance with the appropriate interim/final Defense 
Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) Rule/Clause or 
MIL-STD-130 as appropriate.  (DoD, 2005) 
The primary objective of the DoD Directive for UID implementation is to 
establish policy and prescribe the criteria and responsibilities for creation, maintenance, 
and dissemination of UID data standards for discrete entities (DoD, 2007), These 
standards will allow users on-demand information, which is essential to accountability, 
control, and management of DoD assets and resources.  The mandate requires all assets 
procured under certain parameters to have UID markings.  All assets must also have a 
globally unique serial number embedded in a 2D Data matrix barcode directly marked on 
the part or on a label affixed to the part.  The information contained in the UID label must 
be stored in a DoD database called the DoD UID Registry.  Any product label technology 
chosen should work along with or enhance the DoD UID registry and DoD mandate.  
This will allow the RFID/UID product to be an asset to DoD UID registry instead of 
becoming additional work to the inventory process. 
It is important to understand how the DoD envisions the IUID implementation.  
The requirement is identified in many DoD policies and documents.  The “Concept of 
Operations for IUID Enabled Maintenance in Support of DoD Material Readiness” 
describes the improvements and benefits that can be obtained from a fully IUID enabled 
environment. Certain scenarios in the document are compared to current and future 
system capabilities in the Marine Corps to assist in determining the feasibility of IUID 
within the Marine Corps armories (Symbol, 2005). 
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B. NAVY 
The Marine Corps falls under the Department of the Navy (DoN).  Therefore, the 
Navy has departments that support the requirements of the Marine Corps.  NWSC Crane 
is one of those departments.  NWSC Crane supports the Marine Corps by assisting in the 
accountability of small arms assets that belong to the Marine Corps.  JAMISS is a system 
that was developed under the Navy’s supervision that is designed to assist in the 
maintenance and support of military assets.  Both NWSC Crane and JAMISS are capable 
of improving small arms weapons management. 
1. NWSC Crane 
Among other responsibilities, the NWSC Crane is responsible for ensuring the 
accountability of small arms weapons in the Marine Corps.  Individual units maintain 
weapons for training and operational usage.  On a daily basis, weapons within the Marine 
Corps are received, transferred and released to users, and these transactions are forwarded 
to NWSC Crane where the consolidated record of these changes are maintained and 
recorded.  At any given time, NWSC Crane manages 632-700 different Crane reports for 
the Marine Corps.  On a monthly basis, NWSC Crane receives by fax, email, or mail 
record changes that equate to 40,000-70,000 transaction per month or 400-700 
transactions per day per worker.  The record changes are received and processed by any 
of the five logistic management processors working at NWSC Crane (Figure 16).  The 
capability of NWSC Crane’s processes must be examined to determine how effective 
they will be to a UID/RFID Marine Corps armory program.  
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Figure 16. Crane Record Change Flowchart 
2. Joint Asset Maintenance Integrated Support System (JAMISS) 
JAMISS is a Navy maintenance asset management system and is currently being 
used by the Marine Corps.  It can be configured to manage assets using IUID or RFID.  
The Web based system provides connectivity between the end user and the program 
office.  It is capable of maintaining and tracking detailed information on parts, 
maintenance and usage of assets with the use UID or RFID.   
JAMISS requires each user to have a common access card (CAC) in order to 
maintain security levels.  Sensors onboard assets identify health, usage and maintenance 
issues that are communicated to the computer system indicating the identification, 
location, inventory, maintenance demand and operational status.  This allows maintainers 


































communicate with Marine Corps legacy support systems like Supported Activities 
Supply System (SASSY) and Maintenance Management System (MIMMS) in order to 
quickly and smoothly process repair part orders.  The ability to communicate with the 
Marine Corps Equipment Readiness Information Tool (MERIT) and the Federal Logistics 
Data (FEDLOG) reduces clerical errors caused by transcription.  Drop-down menus 
reduce the input of broad and non-descriptive maintenance information further reducing 
transcription errors.  The servers store the information for future use.   The information is 
also forwarded to enterprise servers for higher-level backup.  In addition, program 
managers and higher-level decision makers filter the enterprise server information for 
visibility and usage data.  This paperless system allows the Marine Corps program 
managers to better maintain assets and operational decision makers to employ assets with 
maximum effectiveness. 
C. MARINE CORPS 
The Marine Corps currently have small arms assets that are marked with UID.  
The Marine Corps Logistics Base (MCLB) Albany receives these assets and distributes 
them to units throughout the Marine Corps.  MCLB also handles the maintenance of 
those assets.  One of the units which weapons are distributed to is the School of Infantry 
(SOI) West at Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton.  This unit has the largest armory with 
the Marine Corps.  Units such as SOI are supported by logistic sections such as supply 
maintenance, and admin that have legacy systems that are UID compatible or 
communicate with each other.  The Global Combat Support System Marine Corps 
(GCSS-MC) is the future system that seeks to replace the separate logistic systems within 
the Marine Corps.  The following section explains MCLB Albany, SOI West and GCSS-
MC relationships to UID application in the Marine Corps. 
1. Marine Corps Logistic Base (MCLB) Albany 
The MCLB Albany, Georgia, handles the receipt of new weapons into the Marine 
Corps and their distribution to various units.  The Fleet Support Department (FSD) at 
Logistics Command (LOGCOM) Albany, Georgia, has developed a streamlined receipt 
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process for weapons.  In addition, they are capable of pulling inventory information 
directly from individual units.  This information can be consolidated and forwarded 
directly to NWSC Crane.  This can possibly eliminate the current process of annual 
Crane reports conducted by individual units.  Additionally, FSD is responsible for 
handling all depot-level maintenance of small arms within the Marine Corps.  This 
material flow is shown in Figure 17.  We examined the current FSD procedures to 
determine their effects on a Marine Corps armory system. 
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2. School of Infantry (SOI) West 
When Marines graduate from boot camp, they attend the School of Infantry in 
SOI West, Camp Pendleton, or SOI East, Camp Lejeune.  The SOI teaches entry-level 
Marines basic warrior skills.  The school also teaches Marines, from corporal to 
lieutenant, advanced infantry and light armored vehicle skills.  Marines who receive the 
infantry military specialty are trained at Infantry Training Battalion (ITB), and all non-
infantry Marines are trained in basic infantry/Marine common skills at Marine Combat 
Training Battalion (MCTB).  The SOI marks a transition in the professional training of 
entry-level students from trained Marines to Marine warriors (USMC School of Infantry 
(West, 2003).  Each SOI has a large supply of gear to support the 14,000 students that go 
through the school annually.  Each class of students constantly cycles through the combat 
gear that consists of vehicles, weapons and equipment.  It is important to know how 
IUID-marked assets withstand usage from the Marines at SOI West, the largest armory in 
the Marine Corps.  
3. Global Combat Support System (GCSS-MC) 
GCSS-MC is a portfolio of AIT systems that supports the logistics elements of 
Command and Control (C2), joint logistics interoperability and secure access to logistics 
data.  At the core of GCSS-MC is the Logistics Chain Management (LCM) initiative, 
which is the incremental implementation of commercial-off-the-shelf software (Oracle e-
Business Suite) to enable the Logistics Operational Architecture (LOG OA). 
The first increment, “Block 1,” provides initial capabilities for GCSS-MC/LCM 
and is a separate acquisition program with its own milestone events.  It is focused on 
improved supply and maintenance capability in the operating forces. GCSS-MC will 
include the retirement of the following legacy systems: (SASSY), (MIMMS), Asset 
Tracking, Logistics, and Supply System (ATLASS) that are used to maintain the Marine 
Corps armory inventory. 
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GCSS-MC is the medium for the exchange of information for future logistic 
systems in the Marine Corps that will be  enhanced with the use of UID.  It is essential to 




IV. REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF EXISTING STUDIES 
Various studies have been conducted with similar objectives to ours.  However, 
they are isolated studies that do not consider the integration of Marine Corps 
organizations and systems.  We review these studies to examine what they are able to 
contribute to a better understanding of how the IUID and RFID can most effectively be 
used Marine Corps armories. 
A. ANNISTON ARMY DEPOT, FT CARSON (SMARTRACK) 
A Small Arms Use Case Demonstration (SAUCD) at the Army’s 2nd Battalion, 
8th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division, tested the SMARTRACK automated Armory system.  
SMARTRACK is a fully automated electronic information software application and 
database management system, specializing in weapons tracking for military or law 
enforcement management environments. It accepts parameters to manage an unlimited 
variety of weapon-related equipment.  Every SMARTRACK system is fully functional in 
a standalone environment, such as in a field or base deployment.  It has the capability to 
network an unlimited number of individual armories to facilitate the exchange of data and 
physical weapons (Williams, 2007). 
The SAUCD test included the following objectives (Krumhaus, 2008): 
• Determine the feasibility of applying data matrix symbols containing 
unique item identifiers (UII) and/or barcodes to small arms in the field 
(Phase I) 
• Determine the ability of a digital arms room system to use IUID to 
manage serially managed items stored in the arms room and to generate 
value for the Soldier (Phase II) 
• Assess the durability of standard IUID markings specified for legacy small 
arms (Phase III) 
A team from Anniston Army Depot (ANAD) at Fort Carson, CO, was tasked to 
apply the IUID tags to the weapons using TESA tape.  During the test, it was discovered 
that the IUID data matrix on new factory-marked M-4 semi-automatic rifle sustained 
damaged.  A picture of one of those weapons is shown in Figure 18.  The physical 
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damage might prevent the IUID from being read.  If the tag is unreadable, the 
information has to be physically typed into a computer to perform the inventory process, 
significantly slowing down the automated process that SMARTRACK offers.  The test 
concluded that achieving the potential benefits of digital arms rooms for the Army would 
require providing the armory with the capability to remark the weapon with IUID tags 
when the original markings is damaged or destroyed.  As seen in Figure 18, a locally 




Figure 18. M-4 with damaged UID marking 
From (Williams, 2007) 
 
 
During the SAUCD test ID Integration, Inc., a parts marking and system-
integration company, conducted a barcode verification of small arms weapons at 
Anniston Army Depot at Fort Carson in August 2008.  They advertise themselves as an 
independent systems integrator of industrial-marking systems offering hardware and 
software solutions, providing customers with unbiased choices for "best-in-class" 
performance, and matched to the customers’ unique application requirements (Anderson, 
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2008).  They conducted a formal quality assessment of nearly 200 individual UID 
markings to evaluate tag damage levels after more than three months of field use.  The 
evaluation included black anodized TESA tape, Aluma Mark aluminum foil and black 
anodized (direct part marking) DPM.  The most significant influencing factor towards 
lowered tag quality was not damage, but production flaws during the laser marking 
process.  TESA tape labels exhibited the lowest quality levels, with 20% not meeting the 
requirements of the Department of Defense Standard Practice Identification Marking of 
US Military Property, MIL-STD-130N.  This was largely due to production flaws and the 
1-part commercial clear coat that was used on top of the labels.  The coating was easily 
scratched or flaked, leaving the tag less readable and subject to damage.  The flat, black 
anodized labels from the weapons vendor (Colt) exhibited the best overall barcode 
quality results, with only 2% not meeting the requirements of MIL-STD-130N.  
However, the periphery of these labels exhibited a noticeable degree of chipping, 
possibly due to the choice of adhesive used.  Non-flat aluminum foil labels (those with 
formed edges and corners) sustained a noticeable degree of denting and buckling that 
increased their chance of peeling off the weapon surface.  These flaws also resulted in a 
degree of light shadowing that made scanning more difficult from certain angles.  These 
conclusions are consistent with problems that are common to many types of tags.  TESA 
tape and aluminum foil labels showed numerous types of durability issues.  An armory 
using these labels may experience reading and/or durability problems that would interfere 
with the inventory processing times. 
Sergeant Shorter, an armorer that worked at Ft Carson during the SMARTRACK 
test, noted that after the weapons were used, the UID labels installed on the weapons 
were scratched beyond readability 3%-4% of the time (Shorter, 2008).  With 20% of 
TESA tape labels not meeting the DoD standards and 3%-4% of UID damage being 
caused after the weapons were issued, we can conclude that 16%-17% of UID tags were 
received damaged or not readable from the manufacturer.  This reinforces the observation 
that the leading factor behind lowered tag quality is not damage, but production flaws 
during the laser marking process. 
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B. UNITED KINGDOM RFID WEAPONS AND ARMORY MANAGEMENT 
SYSTEM 
We reviewed information about the development of a standalone computer-based 
management system for a police armory in the United Kingdom (UK).  The system 
demonstrated how RFID technology was implemented to record individuals who were 
issued weapons and to control and record their respective firearms.  The UK police 
securely attach RFID tags to a range of weapons currently in use, and RFIDs are also 
incorporated within the identification cards of the respective officers.  There were 
approximately 300 long arms and 50 pistols used in the demonstration.  After the tag was 
fitted to the weapon, the RFID tag number replaced the serial number as the unique 
identifier, the tags were electronically scanned using a handheld reader, and the 
information was fed to a computer database.  The initial fail rate was 2-3 RFID tags from 
the batch of 350.  After the first year of operation, there were less than five RFID tags 
replaced due to read failures.  Additionally, 2-3 of the RFID tags detached from the long-
arm weapons due to adhesive issues during the first year (Dean, 2006). 
The RFID tags were produced in two forms that were appropriate for the weapon 
type.  They were also designed to fit the following criteria. 
• Did not interfere with a weapon’s usual handling 
• Did not interfere with a weapon’s operation 
• Fit in a place where it is accessible to be read and replaced if necessary.  
These criteria led to a thin laminated self-adhesive RFID tag fitted to handguns (Figure 
19).  For long arms, an encapsulated RFID tag within plastic form was glued with strong 
adhesive to the weapon (Figure 20).  These methods and placement may not be suitable 
for all handguns and long-arm weapons. 
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Figure 19. 9MM with RFID Tag 
From (Dean, 2006) 
 
                
Figure 20. Long Arm with RFID Tag 
From (Dean, 2006) 
 
The UK case study identified the following limitations to implementing RFID 
tags on small arms: 
• Tag reading performance is likely to be affected when the RFID tag is fitted to 
metal. 
• After-market grips containing metal inserts affect the performance of the 
RFID tag. 
• The position of tag on the weapon must be carefully decided because its 
placement could interfere with the operation of the weapon. 
• Lubricants are likely to cause adhesion problems during fitting of tags. 
• The RFID tag used had a short read range.  This required deliberate attention 





The limitations of this study are consistent with the implementation of RFID within a 
Marine Corps Armory system.  The Marine Corps would need to encase the RFID tag in 
order to protect it from damage during usage of the weapon.  This system and test simply 
indicates that there are viable ways of marking or attaching an RFID tag to a hand 
weapon so the RFID tag is not exposed to the environment and abrasion caused by 
normal use.  Table 3 compares IUID and RFID technology under the UK computer-based 
system. When RFID is compared to IUID, the capabilities appear balanced except for 
damage to tags and reading interference. 
 
Table 3. UK Computer Based Armory System Analysis 
After (Dean, 2006) 
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RFID tags used in the UK computerized armory system have less damage because 
they are encapsulated inside the weapon.  The encapsulation protects the tag from the 
environment and assists in maintaining its durability.  The current IUID used by the DoD 
is only protected from the environment by a coating on the TESA tape and data labels.  
Other forms of IUID labeling such as laser etching are not protected.  In addition, current 
IUIDs have shown to have durability issues that were identified at SOI West, the Small 
Arms Use Demonstration at Anniston Army Armory Depot in Ft Carson, and during the 
UID-marking pilot program at the US Army Armament Research, Development and 
Engineering Center, which is discussed in the next section. 
The case study shows that existing technology has the capability to transmit 
weapons issue data from remote locations, such as a mobile issue point. A mobile issue 
point is supported by the armory and their database as shown in Figure 21 (Dean, 2006).  
If the UK system is configured to use IUID, tags may become unreadable due to the 
current durability issues and reduced protection from environmental conditions.  The 
inability to read the tags requires keeping current administrative forms to transcribe 
weapon issue information.  These forms would continue to be physically sent to the 
armory from the mobile issue point. 
The transcription of information increases the probability of error.  Little’s Law 
can be used to analyze this process.  It states that the inventory in the process is related to 
the throughput rate and the throughput time by the following equation (Inventory= 
Rate*Time) (Schroeder, 2007).  Little’s Law proves that there is a direct relationship 
between time and inventory.  An increase or decrease in time results in the same 
percentage of increase or decrease in inventory.  The need for a Marine to transcribe data 
would require more time.  Therefore, the time required to cover the variability caused by 
durability or engineering design of IUID tags will result in more inventory.  The 
inventory would be Marines who are waiting in a queue to be issued or de-issued 
weapons.  With the addition of each mobile issue point and the percentage of errors from 
transcription, the time required to transcribe and transport information to the armory will 
be multiplied.  
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Figure 21. Data Transfer from Remote Locations 
 
C. UID MARKING PILOT PROGRAM 
With the DoD decision to implement a policy to mark all small-arm assets with 
IUID, we needed to determine the most appropriate marking.  With this goal, the DoD 
selected the Joint Small Arms Coordinating Group (JSACG) to conduct a test called the 
UID Marking Pilot Program to study environmental conditions on IUID marks attached 
to small arm weapons.  From May 2004 to September 2005, JSACG conducted 
environmental studies designed to investigate and identify current and future IUID 
markings technologies.  In the first phase, the JSACG selected thirty M-9 pistols and 
thirty 240-machine gun receivers based on metal composition and multi-purpose use.  
The receiver is the main body of the weapon not to include trigger mechanism, butt stock 
or barrel.  The M-9 receivers were marked with nine different methods and the M-240 










Table 4. UID Environmental Testing 
From (Boyle, 2006, 19) 
Method Coating M-9 M-240 
Krylon N/A 2 
Bare Phosphate N/A 4 
Anodized 4 N/A 
DataLase Clear coat 3 2 
Laser Coat and 
Discolor 
Aluma Hyde II 2 2 
Aluma Hyde II 2 3 
DataLase Clear coat 2 2 
Evershield 2 4 
Laser Etch & Clear 
Coat 
No coating 2 3 
No Coating 4 6 
Aluma Hyde II N/A 2 
DataLase N/A 2 
Deep Laser 
Engraving 
Krylon N/A 2 
TESA Tape  9 8 
 
 
The sample receivers marked with TESA adhesive labels, deep laser and laser 
etching UID were then exposed to salt fog, sand and dust testing.  In the second phase, 
the remaining receivers were exposed to hot/cold temperatures, icing and chemical 
testing. 
The tests showed that the laser coat, laser etching and coating, and deep laser 
engraving UID markings suffered significant damage and were not readable 100% of the 
time (Figures 22-25).  Additionally, the JSACG concluded that the TESA adhesive 
labeling with clear coating was the most reliable and readable after exposure tests. 
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Figure 22. Deep Laser Engraving after Hot, Cold and Icing 




Figure 23. Deep Laser Engraving after Salt Fog 




Figure 24. Laser Etch and Clear Coat after Hot, Cold and Icing 





Figure 25. TESA Tape after Environmental Testing 
From (Boyle, 2006) 
 
 
The tests conducted by JSACG included thirty receivers.  However, the sample 
size of each environmental test was much smaller.  For example, only nine M-9 out of the 
30 receivers were tested with TESA tape. Without a large enough sample, the population 
is improperly represented.  The reliability of this test could have been improved with a 
larger sample size.  Therefore high percentages of readable tags after testing does not 
necessarily equate to good reliability with a very small sample.  Additionally, the 
exposure time for each environment condition should have been the same.  All tests were 
conducted for a 24-hour period except the salt fog test, which lasted 240 hours.  This 
significant timeframe difference must have skewed the results.  Most important, the test 
failed to expose the UID tags to normal training and operational environments.  Attaching 
UID labels to weapons instead of scrap receivers could have achieved this.  Since this test 
was not performed, the results do not reflect an accurate simulation that would bear 
results to make a satisfactory determination. 
Based on the conclusions in the report, it was recommended that metal data plates 
or vinyl labels (TESA tape) be used on weapons going through the depot-level rebuilding 
process and on currently fielded weapons.  A more comprehensive examination may have 
yielded different results and recommendations. 
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D. SOI WEST IUID TEST AND EVALUATION 
SOI West conducted their own test and evaluation of IUID using a sample of 
IUID tagged weapons within their own armory.  The assets examined are listed in the 
Table 5.  The results of this evaluation showed that 44% to 87% of the tags were 
damaged.  Currently there is no system in place to remark damaged IUIDs.  Therefore, 
these averages would certainly result in a degradation and abandonment of a inventory 
system using IUID.  This evaluation reenforces the idea that IUID tags currently used in 
the Marine Corps require some type of redesign to improve durability and give the 
reliability required for proper inventory control.  
 
Table 5. SOI West Damaged IUID Results 
From (Burns, 2008) 
 
Asset Tested Damaged IUID Percent Damaged 
M240B 264 117 44% 
M249 164 93 57% 
AN/PEQ-15 32 28 87% 
AN/PVS-14 289 238 82% 
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V. ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT IUID IMPLEMENTATION 
EFFORTS IN THE DOD 
The DoD and the organizations within it such as the Navy and Marine Corps have 
concepts and systems that will affect the implementation of IUID in the Marine Corps.  A 
closer look at these concepts and systems is needed in order to determine if they are 
compatible with each other.  The DoD concept of operations is discussed in Section A. 
The relevant systems within the Marine Corps and Navy are discussed in Sections B and 
C.  In addition, we review the current IUID implementation efforts within the Marine 
Corps and Navy in Sections B and C. 
A. DOD 
The DoD is the overarching entity that establishes concepts for the military 
services.  Military services such as the Marine Corps are required to implement the 
application of such items as UID based on the vision of the DoD.  Therefore, it is 
important to understand how the DoD visions the implementation of UID. This section 
covers the DoD’s Concept of Operations and various assumptions relevant to UID 
implementation. 
1. Concept of Operations 
The concept of operations for the IUID - Enabled maintenance in support of DOD 
material readiness document states that new IUID-enabled systems will be brought 
online and older systems will be turned off. The success of UID implementation and 
usage within military logistics depends heavily on systems that are UID compatible and 
allow the flow of UID from system to system.  The concept of operations clearly states 
that the first order should be to identify how IUID data will enter the mainstream of 
existing systems and databases (Durant & Anderson, 2007).  However, the Marine Corps 
has already began issuing new assets and legacy items with IUID markings without 
having current or new automated information systems to support UID.  GCSS-MC is the 
operating system that will enable IUID asset information to be communicated throughout 
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the Marine Corps.  However, Block 1 will not be available until 2010 or later, and it will 
not allow IUID information to flow from system to system. 
2. Field-level Assumptions 
The Concept of Operations assumes that the Maintenance Management Programs 
(MMP) within the different military services is able to view the on-hand stock of the 
organizational supply units.  In the Marine Corps, most supply sections are not allowed to 
maintain a Pre-expended Bin (PEB) of supply. Usually the maintenance section maintains 
a PEB for certain parts and consumables with proper authorization.  MIMMS, the system 
used by maintenance sections in Marine Corps, does not have the capability to allow the 
user to view the General Account Balance Files (GABF) that shows what the SASSY 
Management Unit (SMU) has on hand.  GCSS-MC is intended to supply this capability 
for the Marine Corps when it is brought online. 
 In field-level operations under the concept of operations, the MMP and 
associated systems all have UID specific fields, but Marine Corps systems are not 
currently equipped with them.  Block 1 of GCSS, which is scheduled for 2010, will have 
fields for IUID.  However, those fields will have no functions to enable linkage between 
other systems. It is not known in which block of GCSS the IUID fields will have 
functions.  To support such UID capable systems, many affiliated sections such as 
supply, maintenance, and the TMO will require UID readers to read tags to document the 
transportation and movement of assets in the MMP and UID registry.  
3. Sustainment-level Operations Assumptions 
As mentioned in Chapter IV, the Concept of Operations document highlights 
several scenarios that describe an envisioned end-state of total asset visibility using IUID.  
Scenario 2 of the Concept of Operations document encompasses depot operations, supply 
interfaces, and lifecycle management.  In this scenario, the depot-level production 
manager uses a depot information system (DIS) to run automated daily review of the 
supported services’ maintenance databases.  It may show, for instance, that an 
unserviceable, repairable item is being retrograded to the depot level.  The national stock 
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number (NSN) and IUID identify the asset.  The DIS would crosscheck the IUID with the 
service’s information network, potentially linked through enterprise resource planning 
(ERP) software, which reports the asset is already in transit via a commercial carrier and 
provides a tracking number.  Using the tracking number, the DIS is programmed to 
automatically track the status of the inbound item as it moves to the depot, indicating its 
time of arrival.  Using the IUID provided, the production control manager opens a 
receiving-and-repair induction notice for the inbound asset.  (Durant & Anderson, 2007) 
This scenario directly relates to the depot-level maintenance facilities within the 
Marine Corps at Albany, GA, or Barstow, CA.  The depot-level maintenance facilities are 
able to see what weapons are inbound through the NWSC Crane small arms registry.  
However, this system does not include IUID fields.  According to Kathleen Row, Senior 
Acquisition Quality Manager in the Small Arms Division of NWSC Crane, there are no 
plans in place yet to add IUID fields in the NWSC Crane small arms weapons registry.  
Because the system does not include IUID fields, the depot may not be able to pull 
inbound information from the small weapon registry.  Therefore, the current plans at 
NWSC Crane does not match the Concept of Operations document 
When units in the Marine Corps ship items, they employ their local TMO office, 
which assigns a Transportation Control Number (TCN) to assists receiving and tracking 
packages.  An RFID tag is placed on the most packages based on the value of its content 
and destination.  The location of tagged packages is identified when the RFID tag crosses 
a corresponding transponder.  Many times, there is only a transponder at the exit of the 
delivering base and the entrance of the receiving base.  Therefore, the asset cannot be 
tracked, which results in no visibility between military bases or destinations using the 
RFID.  In order to get information that is more detailed, the third party commercial 
carrier delivering the package would have to be contacted.  Tracking the package using 
an IUID system would require the TMO offices within the Marine Corps to have IUID 
fields added to their systems, or invest in new programs that include IUID fields and 
IUID-capable readers.  According the Marine Corps Lead on AIT, there are no known 
current or future Marine Corps TMO transportation systems that can or will track asset 
shipments by IUID.  Additionally, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense – Supply 
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Chain Integration (OSD-SCI) has indicated that IUID is a supply concept and does not 
need to be carried over to transportation transactions.  Therefore, IUID transportation 
organizations throughout the DoD will not incorporate system transactions to enable 
IUID tracking.  This reinforces the idea that the DoD Concept of Operations is not in-line 
with the Navy’s and Marine Corps’ current or future capabilities. 
B. MARINE CORPS 
The flow of weapons through MCLB Albany is important to the individual 
armories throughout the Marine Corps.  The capacity and flow of weapons though MCLB 
Albany affect the readiness of the units they support.  For this reason, it is important to 
understand the process flow of weapons at MCLB Albany.  SOI is one of the units who 
receive UID marked assets from MCLB Albany.  The performance of UID at SOI will 
most likely mirror what will happen at smaller armories throughout the Marine Corps.  
As the largest Marine Corps armory   GCSS-MC is the platform that will support IUID 
tag information and allow that information to be passed throughout the Marine Corps.  
Therefore, it is imperative to examine if SOI IUID tagged assets received from MCLB 
can with stand the usage from the SOI training environment long enough for GCSS-MC 
to become operational. 
1. MCLB Albany 
In March of 2003, the FSD significantly improved their weapons receipt process 
with the use of barcodes.  This improvement helped to reduce their process time, error 
rate, manpower required for receipts, and the amount of resources required to process 
incoming weapons.  The initial process for both new procurement received from 
contractors and items requiring maintenance from Marine Corps units was seen during 
our visit to FSD and is described in the following steps: 
1. A container of weapons is received into the warehouse. 
2. Personnel open the container and inventory each item one by one to certify 
content, and serial numbers, then validate it on the inventory list. 
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3. If any error is found, the correction is annotated on the shipping document 
and stamped by personnel. 
4. After the inventory, a quality control person checks the items. 
5. One by one, the items are entered in the FSD database.  Each item has at 
least two fields of data to include NSN and serial number. 
6. The box is then sealed and placed on location to await shipment to a unit or 
to an external or internal maintenance facility. 
7. The shipping information is then forwarded to the supply personnel who  
electronically receives the items in Mechanization of Warehousing and 
Shipment Procedures (MOWASP) and then on to the Weapons Serial File 
(WSF).  The MOWASP is equivalent to the Mechanized Allowance List 
(MAL) and the WSF is equivalent to the CMR. 
8. The shipping document along with a cover letter itemizing the receipt of 
items is compiled. 
9. The cover letter, along with documentation, is forwarded to the FSD 
director for signature.  This package is then express-mailed to NWSC 
Crane. 
The FSD was able to smooth the process for new procurements from contractors 
by using barcode lists received from the manufacturer as described in Figure 26.  The 
barcode lists were then scanned into an FSD database, which reduced transcription errors 
in step 3 and processing times in steps 2 and 5.  However, weapon shipments received 
from Marine Corps units do not have barcodes and are processed individually once 
received.  Therefore, the material handler must manually input the information on each 
weapon in the database.  This will increase the amount of time required for the material 
hander to do his job to more than 18 minutes. 
Additionally, when the information is forwarded to Crane by MCLB Albany, it is 
submitted electronically in a plain text format using Microsoft Notepad, as shown in 
Figure 27.  This electronic transcription reduces the likeliness for error that is created 
when weapon information is typed on a cover letter as in step 9.  This is because the 
information forwarded to NWSC Crane in Microsoft Notepad is in the same format that 
NWSC Crane is using in their data processing.  Since NWSC Crane does not have to 
reformat the necessary data, their processing time is reduced. 
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Figure 26. As Is Weapons Receipt Process Time Analysis  




Figure 27. Notepad Data Information Sent to Crane 




           UNIT 
        From    To    document number NSN            serial no  date  
LOAD   |M93055|MMSA01|M930558168E801|1005014123129  |U49174    20080725      
LOAD   |M93055|MMSA01|M930558168E801|1005014123129  |U47930    20080725      
LOAD   |M94145|MMSA01|M941458136E849|1005014711774  |4493      20080725      
LOAD   |M94145|MMSA01|M941458141E877|1005007265636  |5000913   20080725     
LOAD   |M94216|MMSA01|M942168145E030|1005007265636  |M3023558  20080725            
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The Small Arms Maintenance section at LOGCOM conducts maintenance and 
repair on Marine Corps weapon assets.  There is also a smaller area within the section 
that tests and creates IUID tags that are applied to Marine Corps assets.  The maintenance 
section currently has the capability to place IUID labels on legacy weapons.  As of July 
2008, this section is not currently using the special printers to do so because they are 
waiting on instruction from Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) to specify what 
information is to be printed on the IUID tag.  Additionally, it was discovered by James 
Gagnon, the engineering technician of the Industrial Engineering section at LOGCOM, 
that several weapons received by LOGCOM that are marked with IUID are not in the 
DoD UID registry as contracted and mandated by the DoD. Figure 28 shows a specific 
weapon with the IUID tag, and the screen shot (Figure 29) from the DoD UID registry 
shows that the weapon was never registered into the database.  If the asset is not entered 
into the UID Registry, there will be no asset visibility as envisioned by the DoD.  The 
Notepad format sent to NWSC Crane is similar to scanned information that can be read 
into databases via barcode reader.  Both the Notepad process and scanner enable the 
sender and receiver to reduce processing time.  
 
 
Figure 28. M-240 Receiver Assembly 




Figure 29. M-240 UID Registry Information 
From (Gagnon, 2008) 
 
2. SOI West 
The armory at SOI West is the largest armory in the Marine Corps.  The 
implementation of IUID marked assets has led it to having many assets already marked 
with IUID.  Small arm weapons and optics are marked with TESA tape and laser etching.  
It was noticed by SOI armory staff that the IUID markings were becoming damaged after 
one student cycle (one student cycle being one month) and significantly damaged by the 
end of the second student cycle.  Many of the students at SOI do not go through the 
rigorous training that they would receive at infantry units or in actual operational 
missions.  Many machine guns are issued and are only used on the firing range.  While on 
the firing range, the weapon is moved to and from the gun line, ammunition is inserted 
and fired from the weapon, and the barrel is changed when needed.  The firing range 
environment does not expose the weapon and IUID to constant movement through 
different terrain or movement in and out of vehicles.  Nonetheless, tag damage happens, 
as shown in Figures 30-33 of weapons from SOI West with damaged IUID markings.  
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Figure 30. 249 Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW) Machine Gun 




Figure 31. Night Vision Equipment 







Figure 32. M-16A4 





Figure 33. Advanced Combat Optical Gun sight (ACOG) 
From (Burns, 2008) 
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Based on the evidence from the pictures, it is obvious that there are durability 
issues concerning IUID markings at SOI West, which may interfere with the capability to 
read and therefore track the asset.  According to Robert Leibrandt, Deputy of Unique 
Identification Policy Office, inventory management cannot be accomplished (through the 
“Inventory + Tracking = Management” equation identified in the DoD Concept of 
Operations document) if the identity of a specific item cannot be tracked throughout its 
lifetime (Durant & Anderson, 2007).  
3. GCSS-MC 
Government Accounting Office (GAO) has designated the DoD business systems 
modernization as a high-risk program because, among other things, it has been 
challenged in implementing key information technology (IT) management controls on its 
thousands of business systems.  The GCSS-MC program is one such system.  Initiated in 
2003, the program is intended to modernize the Marine Corps logistics systems.  The first 
increment is expected to cost about $442 million and is scheduled to be deployed in fiscal 
year 2010.  The GAO was asked to determine whether the Department of the Navy 
(DoN) is effectively implementing IT management controls on this program.  To 
accomplish this, GAO analyzed the program’s implementation of several key IT 
management disciplines, including economic justification, earned value management, 
risk management, and system quality measurement. 
The GAO made recommendations to the Secretary of Defense aimed at limiting 
investment in the program, addressing its cost, estimating its schedule, managing its risk, 
and observing system quality measurement weaknesses.  The DoD agreed in full or in 
part with GAO’s recommendations and described ongoing and planned actions intended 
to address the recommendations (GAO, 2008). 
The Marine Corps invested in 2003 GCSS-MC technology when it was 
innovative and prominent.  In 2008, they are continuing to invest in the program.  In 
order to adhere to contractual agreements ascertained during the acquisition process, the 
Marine Corps must accept the technology obtained in 2003 that will be implemented in 
2010 (when block 1 of GCSS-MC is actually scheduled to be implemented).  To avoid 
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obtaining yesterday’s technology tomorrow, the Marine Corps must invest more funds to 
upgrade the GCSS-MC program that is already behind schedule.  Due to the continually 
increasing pace of improvements in technology, current technology loses its value at a 
much greater rate.  Therefore, GCSS-MC is also losing its value at a much greater rate.  
Block 1 of GCSS-MC will be available to the end user no earlier than 2010.  GCSS-MC 
full implementation plan for block 2 and 3 is unknown.  The Marine Corps is unable to 
gain system integration knowledge each year GCSS-MC is not available to the end-user.  
Logistical and operational knowledge will also be delayed with each delay of a GCSS-
MC.  GCSS-MC loses value each day it is unavailable to the end-user (due to knowledge 
unattained about the system).  GCSS-MC is the medium of exchange that will enable 
IUID usage in the Marine Corps.  Additionally, block 1 of GCSS-MC will include IUID 
fields.  However, those fields will be nonfunctional.  It is unknown within which block of 
GCSS-MC that the fields will have functional capabilities, which would allow IUID to 
have interlinking capabilities (Morton, 2008). 
Implementation of IUID within the Marine Corps depends on the success of 
GCSS-MC and therefore, system integration, logistic, and operational knowledge will be 
delayed for IUID.  As a result, UID technology organic to the Marine Corps is devalued, 
with each delay of GCSS-MC.  This is due to the systems not being available for use and 
rapid improvements in technology.   
C. NAVY 
The Navy provides paid support to the Marine Corps to assist in the 
accountability of small arm assets.  NWSC Crane plans to improve their system.  These 
improvements could reduce the time NWSC Crane and supported units require to report 
weapon changes.  JAMISS is an established system that could possibly be used to assist 
in the process of weapons in the Marine Corps.  The effective use of these resources 
could positively affect the processes within Marine Corps armories. 
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1. NWSC Crane 
The Marine Corps funds the Navy approximately $650,000 per year to cover the 
labor for five logistic management processors who enter weapon transaction into the 
NWSC Crane database.  These changes consist of NSN, quantity, nomenclature, serial 
number and/or unit change.  If there are errors in the documentation requesting the 
change, the individual logistic management processor contacts the unit by phone or email 
first and then by mail if no response is received by the first two attempts.  NWSC Crane 
previously had backlogs of changes from supported units caused by lack of manpower.  
This backlog would prevent visibility of changes sent by Marine Corps units.  As a result, 
annual Crane reports could be received by units from NWSC Crane without annotated 
changes.  Once they increased their manpower, NWSC Crane eliminated their backlog.  
NWSC Crane’s current process and policy is to process any change within 24 hours of 
receipt.  
The weapons reporting section is currently developing a program to improve its 
process.  The web-based program will include a computer screen that contains all 
required fields for using units.  The user will fill the required data fields that annotate 
their changes, which will automatically update the NWSC Crane weapons records 
system.  This system will not require any hard documents to be submitted to NWSC 
Crane, and it will not allow invalid data, such as erroneous NSN or duplicate serial 
numbers to be submitted, reducing the number of errors that enter the database.  
Electronic signature blocks for workers and supervisors will replace signed cover letters 
and documents that were previously faxed, mailed or scanned to NWSC Crane. 
Since the Small Arms Registry section at Crane completes transactions within 24 
hours of receipt, errors are found within 24 hours or shortly after.  This means the same 
number of errors that were found under the cover letter, fax or mail system previously 
used is found within a shorter amount of time.  This time reduction results in shorter 
processing times for FSD Albany/Barstow, fewer errors due to electronic data 
transcription at FSD and NWSC Crane, and rapid error correction. 
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All the changes made by the units and the FSD are captured in a database at 
LOGCOM called the Master Data repository.  This repository allows LOGCOM to have 
the same visibility and reporting capability as the Small Arms Repository at NWSC 
Crane. 
2. JAMISS 
JAMISS currently has the capability to submit information to the UID Registry.  
Work is currently being conducted at Crane to allow JAMISS to be able to pull 
information from the UID registry.  JAMISS can be employed to track the maintenance 
and equipment usage.  Additionally, JAMISS can be used to smooth out the inventorying 
and ordering process of weapons.  JAMISS is able to incorporate any identification 
platform selected such as barcode, UID and/or RFID.  The JAMISS staff is not required 
to analyze or test RFID or UID, but to support the implementation of a system that may 
use such products as UID and RFID. (Edwards, 2008) 
There are challenges that face the JAMISS program being employed in other 
venues such as Marine Corps armories.  The Marine Corps Installation and Logistics 
office is currently moving forward with the testing of SMARTRACK, an established 
inventory operating system that is being used in several Army armories.  JAMISS can 
communicate with legacy systems such as SASSY, which support the CMR that store the 
inventory of weapons within the Marine Corps.  The Marine Corps is moving toward the 
GCSS-MC system that will replace the SASSY and MIMMS based system.  It is 
questionable whether the Marine Corps should invest in a system like JAMISS that will 
show how well it can support the systems SASSY and MIMMS; and that are intended to 
be replaced by GCSS-MC. 
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VI. ANALYSIS 
RFID and UID technologies are currently being used throughout the DoD.  It is 
difficult to determined at this time if either technology is better than the other.  To 
determine which is more suitable to improve small arms processing within the Marine 
Corps an analysis needs to be conducted.  The thesis group decided to use purpose and 
performance in comparing RFID and UID technologies.  Lastly, operational availability 
and a questionnaire was used to determine the durability of IUID tags and the effect on 
armory readiness within the Marine Corps. 
A. RFID VS. IUID MANAGEMENT DEFINITION AND PURPOSE FOR THE 
DOD 
The purpose and definition of RFID and UID technology throughout the DoD and 
business world is important for our study.  These definitions determine how RFID and 
IUID will be implemented and managed throughout the DoD organizations.  For this 
reasons the definition of IUID management by Air Transport Association (ATA) and 
IUID/RFID purposes by Defense Acquisition University (DAU) require review. 
1. Traceability for Asset Visibility 
The ATA e –Business Forum focused on UID and asset tracking and attempted to 
explain how IUID would lead to effective management of DoD assets.  The ATA uses the 
formula of Identity + Track = Manage (Leibrandt, 2007).  By this formula, if the DoD 
can identify and track assets using IUID, then they will achieve management of the 
assets.  However, the traceability and asset visibility of small arms marked with IUID 
will be less than that of other assets marked with IUID.  This is caused by the reduced 
durability of IUID tags on small arms.  IUID may be more durable for assets where the 
IUID label or tag is less susceptible to damage or exposure to the environment.  For these 
assets the “Identity + Track = Manage” formula may work. 
ATA outlines traceability for asset visibility for small arms (Table 6).  In the 
table, two of the many traceability purposes of small arms are property management and 
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maintenance history.  If, during the traceability events of storage and usage outlined in 
Table 6, the IUID label becomes damaged and unreadable, then the label’s effectiveness 
and degree of visibility is reduced.  Therefore, the “Identity + Track = Manage” formula 
is invalid for such assets because the traceability is lost. 
 
Table 6. Traceability Matrix for Asset Visibility 
From (Leibrandt, 2007, 15) 
TRACEABILITY MATRIX FOR ASSET VISIBILITY 




Traceability Events Traceability Purpose 
By Quantity, by lot 












Property Management, Failure 
Analysis, Safety Assurance, 
Maintenance History, 
Operational Use History, 
Warranty Compliance, Military 
Equipment Valuation, 24/7 
Security 
 
2. Purposes of RFID and IUID 
The Defense Acquisition University (DAU) sites the differences between IUID 
and RFID (Table 7).  The purpose of RFID technology is for supply-chain tracking and 
for automatically acknowledging the receipt of materials.  The purpose of IUID is 
lifecycle data visibility.  The purpose of RFID technology fits the needs of the armory, 
which is to smooth the process and to reduce time of weapons issue and inventory.  
However, the purpose of IUID does not completely fit the needs of the armory.  Although 
data visibility is wanted, it is up to the units to maintain and update the data.  Maintaining 
and obtaining the lifecycle information data within all the different logistic and 
maintenance tracking systems with the Marine Corps is extremely difficult.  Further 
difficulties are added because a weapon does not usually remain with one unit for the 
duration of a weapon’s lifecycle.  In addition, lifecycle visibility does not always equate 
to process reduction.  The design of RFID and IUID tags is central to their purpose.  
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Therefore, it makes more sense to choose a product whose purpose fills the needs and 
requirements of the user.  Based only on Table 7, it may be more suitable to use RFID 
technology for receiving and tracking Marine Corps armory assets. 
 
Table 7. IUID vs. RFID 
After (Defense Acquisition University, 2004) 
IUID vs. RFID 
 IUID RFID 
Marking Item Package 
Technology 2D Data Matrix EPC RFID tag 
Purpose Lifecycle data visibility Supply chain receipt /tracking 
Threshold $5,000, some exceptions None 
Implementation January 1, 2004 January 1, 2005 
 
 
3. IUID vs. RFID Performance Analysis 
In this section, we assume that each small arm would be tagged with either a UID 
or a RFID.  The durability of UID and RFID tags on small arms were both discussed 
Chapter IV.  For the purpose of this analysis, the assumption is that the tags would be 
readable.  Table 8 compares RFID and IUID based on their theorized capability to 
perform in environments that are part of small-arms weapons management: armory, 
armory maintenance, supply, TMO, Depot Repair Maintenance Organization (DRMO) 
and GCSS-MC.  The usefulness of RFID and/or IUID in each environment is graded 
from 1 (poor) to 4 (excellent).  Each operational area is considered to be of equal 
importance; therefore, an average of score was taken for RFID and IUID to provide their 
overall grades. 
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Table 8. IUID vs. RFID Performance Analysis 
 
IUID (Lifecycle) RFID (Tracking) 
Armory Inventory 4 Armory Inventory 3 
  Processing 3   Processing 4 
      Armory 
Maintenance   4 
Armory 
Maintenance   3 
Depot Maintenance 2.5 Depot Maintenance 2.5 
Supply Inventory 3 Supply Inventory 3.5 
TMO Tracking 2 TMO Tracking 4 
DRMO   3 DRMO   3 
Legacy/GCSS-MC Block 1 1 Legacy/GCSS-MC Block 1 4 
Average Score  2.8125 Average Score  3.375 
      
  Excellent 4   
  Good 3   
  Fair 2   
  Poor 1   
 
The following sections describe the grade rationality for each section in Table 8.  
Each section is graded for IUID or RFID based on the given purpose of each from Table 
7.  
a. IUID Analysis 
(1).  Armory. Inventory: IUID labels can be used most effectively 
in the inventory process. Unlike RFID scanning, scanning by IUID allows only one label 
to be identified at a time.  This process eliminates possibility of mistakenly identifying 
numerous labels or the wrong label.  In addition scanning reduces serial number 
transcription errors.  For these reasons, IUID was given a score of 4 for the armory. 
Issuing and Processing: IUID labels would only allow items to 
scanned one item at a time for issuing and processing purposes.  This individual scanning 
processing would require more time in comparison to RFID.  Due to the time factor, 
IUID does not appear to perform as well as RFID for issuing and processing.  Therefore, 
is given a score of 3 for issuing and processing. 
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Any damage to the IUID would prevent reading by scanners and 
require replacement that would slow down processing time.  The job of IUID performs 
could be replicated by tags provided by automated armory inventory systems such as 
Strong Tech and SMARTRACK. 
(2).  Armory Maintenance. The JAMISS system could be used at 
the unit level with IUID to track the maintenance history of assets with IUID labels.  
IUID labels could also enable maintenance sections to quickly inventory items that are on 
hand.  Finally, those items could be tracked by IUID from intake, repair to ready for 
issue.  Due to these benefits provided by IUID in maintenance, IUID was given a score of 
4 for this section. 
(3).  Depot Level.  Maintenance/Inventory:  At the depot level 
IUID labels would smooth the receipt and storage of assets by reducing time and errors.  
Many of the maintenance processes at the depot level would require removal and or 
severe damage to the IUID label.  Therefore, the benefits of the IUID labels would be lost 
after the maintenance process.  At some point, the damaged IUID label would have to be 
recreated.  Due to benefits and drawbacks of IUID at the depot level, the thesis group 
gave IUID a score of 2.5 at the depot level. 
(4).  Supply.  If IUID labels are used as an inventory tool at the 
armory the results could be reported to the supply section is less time and with more 
accuracy.  However, the supply section would need to complete the same amount of work 
to input the inventory changes into the ATLASS and SASSY systems.  This is because 
legacy systems such as ATLASS and SASSY are not configured to receive information 
from scanners or IUID labels.  Since IUID could improve accuracy of work received but 
not the processes within supply IUID was given a score of 3 by the thesis group for the 
supply section. 
(5).  TMO. Tracking: TMO already uses RFID to track packages.  
Therefore, IUID could be used to track the contents of the packages by placing a copy of 
the IUID on the outside of the package.  However, TMO is only interested in tracking the 
package itself.  The sender and receiver are the parties most concerned with the contents 
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of the parcel and would be ones reaping the benefits from IUID not TMO.  Base on this 
analysis, IUID received a score of 2 from the thesis team for TMO.  
(6).  DRMO. Assets are sent to DRMO because they are damaged 
beyond repair, are not worth repairing, or are no longer needed by the unit.  Items turned 
into DRMO are more likely to have damage to the IUID based on its condition and 
reasoning for being sent to DRMO.  However, if the IUID is undamaged it could allow 
processing to be faster.  If personnel can scan or quickly identify the IUID on the item, 
they can annotate its status in the UID registry.  This will reduce the likeliness of the 
same item being sold back to the DoD as a new product once it is disposed of.  However, 
anyone who obtains an item with an IUID marking from DRMO can remove and change 
both the IUID and serial number of the item.  This will enable that old item to enter the 
system as if it were new without detection from the UID registry.  IUID does provide 
benefits to DRMO; however, DRMO’s work can quickly be overcome by deceit.  For this 
reason, IUID was only given a score of 3 for DRMO.  
(7).  Legacy programs/GCSS-MC. Under the mandate and concept 
of operations of the DoD an extensive operations of interlinking system is required to 
meet DoD expectations and requirements.  The UID registry, GCSS-MC, supply, unit 
level maintenance, depot level maintenance and TMO would all need to work together.  
All of the computer systems within those sections would also have to be IUID 
compatible.  The current Marine Corps legacy systems are not IUID compatible.  GCSS-
MC is predicted to consolidate and replace the legacy systems.  However, block 1 of 
GCSS-MC will have IUID implementation without functionality.  Therefore, the benefits 
of IUID will not be reached with legacy systems or with the first phase of GCSS-MC.  
Individual sections such as the armory that may use IUID can transfer limited benefits 
such as reduced errors and time to other sections.  However, legacy systems hinder the 
capacity of using IUID.  Based on this analysis, IUID is given a low score of 1 for legacy 
programs and GCSS implementation. 
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b. RFID Analysis  
(1).  Armory.  Inventory: RFID can be very effective in the 
inventory process of weapons.  However, with RFID an inventory (done by antenna only) 
results in an inventory of the tags but not the item.  Inventories done by antenna do not 
require visual verification.  Therefore, an inventory done by antenna when an asset is 
removed or stolen and the RFID is removed from an asset would result in the same 
inventory as an RFID attached to the asset.  Since RFID provides benefits and have 
shortcomings that may be overcome by sight verification, it was given a score of 3 by the 
thesis team. 
Issuing and processing:  For issuing and processing, the use of 
RFID would reduce the processing time of issuing and processing.  An RFID could 
prevent an un-scanned item from leaving the armory.  This is something an IUID could 
not do.  RFID would appear to do very well for issuing and processing and thus was 
given a score of 4 for this section. 
(2).  Armory Maintenance.  The JAMISS system is capable of 
using RFID to accomplish the maintenance management requirements.  RFID could 
enable maintenance sections to quickly inventory items that are on hand.  The location of 
those items could be tracked by antenna from intake, repair to ready for issue.  RFID 
appears that it would work just as well as IUID in the maintenance section.  However, the 
JAMISS system has not yet been tested with RFID.  Since these tests have not been 
conducted, there may be some unforeseen problems that come with using RFID with 
JAMISS to manage the maintenance of assets.  For the above reasons, RFID received a 
score 3 from the thesis team for the maintenance section. 
(3).  Depot.  At the depot level, RFID would smooth the receipt 
and storage of assets by reducing time and human transcription errors.  Assets attached 
with RFID would allow the asset to be automatically received for through scanning.  The 
scanning process would eliminate transcription errors in that process.  Assets arriving to 
depot level maintenance are usually disassembled and stripped down to bare metal.  
RFID’s attached to these assets will have to be removed or they may become damaged in 
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the repair process.  Therefore, the benefits of the RFID would be lost after the 
maintenance process.  At some point, the RFID tag would have to be replaced.  Due to 
benefits and drawbacks of RFID at the depot level, the thesis group gave RFID a score of 
2.5 at the depot level. 
(4).  Supply.  If RFID tags are used as an inventory tool at the 
armory, the results of the inventory could be reported to the supply section in less time 
and with more accuracy than IUID.  This is because an RFID system will allow multiple 
items to be scanned at once.  However, for IUID, there is a need to physically touch each 
weapon in order to get the correct angle needed to scan the weapons IUID tag.  
Additionally, if sight verification of assets is conducted before an inventory this would 
guarantee that all weapons are accounted for and insure that no weapons have been 
tampered with by having their RFID tags removed. 
Given both these processes, the supply section would still need to 
complete the same amount of work to input the inventory changes into the 
ATLASS/SASSY system.  This is because the legacy systems are not configured to 
receive information from scanners or RFIDs.  Since RFID technology could improve 
accuracy of work received but not the processes within supply RFID was given a score of 
3.5 by the thesis group for the supply section. 
(5).  TMO.  RFID technology has proven to be effective in the 
tracking and accountability of assets.  RFID technology has also smoothed the processing 
of work within TMO. Based on the verifiable information RFID was given a score of 4 
by the thesis team for TMO. 
(6).  DRMO.  Assets that are sent to DRMO are usually damaged 
beyond repair, are not worth repairing, or are no longer needed by the unit.  Items, which 
have been turned into DRMO, are more likely to have damage to the RFID tag based on 
the assets condition and reasoning for being sent to DRMO.  However, if the RFID tag is 
undamaged it could allow for faster processing times. 
Items that go to DRMO are sometimes delivered to a DRMO 
facility located on another base.  These RFID tags could be used to track on-hand items 
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that will not be immediately discarded.  The RFID tags could be used to assist in the 
inventory process of the assets before final disposition is decided.  Due to these benefits, 
RFID was given a score of 3 for DRMO.  
(7).  Legacy programs/GCSS-MC.  RFID tags can improve the 
processes of the armory and other associated sections without the need for secondary 
applications such as the UID registry.  The use of RFID tags can positively affect 
different sections without requiring the inventory and management of new and different 
systems required by the DoD.  For this reason, RFID was given a score of 4 by the thesis 
team. 
c. IUID vs. RFID Performance Analysis Summary 
According to the average scores in Table 8, RFID tags are more suitable 
for improving Marine Corps inventory and tracking processes for armory assets.  The 
difference between the scores is only .463.  This difference may not prove to be 
significant enough to make a definite determination on which technology should be 
considered for use in Marine Corps armories. 
B. OPERATION AVAILABILITY (AO) 
The test at Anniston Army Depot, FT Carson of SMARTRACK uncovered 
questions on the scanning capability and durability of IUID (Figure 18).  The test 
conducted by the JSACG revealed that laser etching is not durable when exposed to 
various environmental conditions.  Although the test conducted may not have 
scientifically or statically organized enough, the results suggest significant attrition rates 
in use of TESA tape and laser etching IUID, which will lead to reduced scanning 
capability.  The durability issues that affect scanning capabilities of IUID tags leads to 
the inability to reduce the weapons processing time of inventorying. 
A basic measure of reliability for repairable systems can be expressed by the 
following Mean Time Between Maintenance (MTBM) equation.  MTBM can be 
explained as the average time between system maintenance requirements or events. 
MTBM can be calculated by the formula: 
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  MTBM = 1 / ( 1 / MTBMu + 1 / MTBMs) 
Since tags will be repaired when the weapon has been brought in for scheduled or 
unscheduled maintenance, this will increase the Mean Down Time (MDT) for both 
scheduled and unscheduled maintenance.  Operational Availability (Ao) is the probability 
that a system or equipment, when used under stated conditions in an actual operational 
environment, will operate satisfactorily when called upon (at any random time).  The 
operational availability is a commonly used readiness measure for weapons systems.  
This value provides the percentage of weapons that are in a mission capable (MC) status; 
this value also represents the percentage of time a system is in MC status.  Therefore, the 
formula can be rewritten as: 
Ao = number of MC systems / total number of systems 
Or the formula can rewritten to include MTBM: 
Ao = MTBM / MTBM + MDT = Uptime / Total time  
where MDT is the total elapsed time required to repair and restore a system to full 
operation status and Total Time = Uptime + Down Time.   
Due to the durability issues surrounding the engineering of the IUID labels, it is 
safe to assume that IUID tags on the assets will be damaged at a fairly high rate.  The 
replacement of the IUID tag will then need to be completed when the asset is brought in 
for maintenance.  This increases the amount of time required to perform maintenance on 
the asset, as compared to the maintenance time required before the asset had an IUID tag.  
According to the Ao formula the longer the assets are under repair the worse the Ao will 
be, because when the MDT is increased, the operational availability will decrease.  
Therefore, there will be fewer small arms assets available for issue to Marines. 
Due to the importance of armory assets and their involvement in the training of 
Marines, it is most likely that Marines will issue armory assets even though they have 
IUID damage.  If this is the case, the IUID system will quickly degrade due to a lack of 
priority associated with the replacement of tags.  Once the number of tags is reduced, the 
benefits of reducing process times and error will suffer. 
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C. QUESTIONNAIRE 
Our thesis group created a survey to see if there were any current issues with 
IUID tags on weapons within Marine Corps armories.  Initially the survey was introduced 
by phone and sent via email to a sample of armories. Due to a small number of replies 
from the e-mailed surveys, our thesis group made the decision to visit Marine Corps Base 
Camp Pendleton, CA.  Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton was a suitable survey site due 
to its proximity to the Naval Post Graduate School and the large number of armories 
located on the base. 
1. Survey Method 
The group selected 38 armories from the MCB Camp Pendleton for the survey.  
Those armories selected where chosen at random while driving on the base.  Each 
participant selected to complete the survey was chosen because they were on duty during 
our visit.  All of the 38 participants were in charge of separate armories, so (there was no 
overlap of arms between participants).  The participants in the survey were initially asked 
if their armory had assets that were marked with IUID.  Almost all the participants were 
unaware of what an IUID was.  Therefore, each survey was introduced to the participants 
by giving a brief introduction of IUID.  The brief introduction included a definition, 
purpose, samples and pictures of IUID.  The survey questionnaire, which is shown in full 
in the Appendix, was composed of seven questions specifically regarding IUID tags and 
physical damage.  Each question is given below and is discussed in the Survey Findings 
section.  The questions are as follows: 
1. On what types of weapons are IUID currently marked on?  When did you 
start receiving weapons with IUID? 
2. Are IUID on currently marked assets showing physical damage? 
3. What seems to be the cause of the physical damage?  
4. How long does it take for IUID to sustain damage from initial weapons 
issue? 
5. What type of physical damage is visible? 
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6. What IUID reading capability do you currently have? 
7. How many weapons do you currently have with damaged IUID and what is 
your total inventory? 
2. Survey Findings 
Question 1:  On what types of weapons are IUID currently marked on?  
When did you start receiving weapons with IUID? 
The group found that the most common weapons the armory personnel listed with 
IUID markings were: 
• M16A4/M4 Rifles 
• Optics/weapon sights (RCO, PEQ-15 and PVS-14) 
• M240B machine guns  
• MK19 ,40mm machine gun grenade launcher 
• M16- SE variants rifles 
Armory personnel stated that weapons with IUID markings were received by 
participating armories from July 2006 to September 2008.  Some participants were not 
sure as to when the weapons showed up with IUID in the armory.  Due to the possibility 
of different batches of weapons arriving at the armory at different time intervals, it is 
impossible to estimate how long the IUID lasted before receiving any damage. But 
clearly this time can be no longer than two years.  
Question 2: Are IUID on currently marked assets showing physical damage? 
Of the participants surveyed, 17 (45%) stated that there was damage, and 21 
(55%), said there was no damage (Figure 34).  Ten participants of the 21 that stated there 
was no damage, later, in question 5, stated a type of damage that was visible. In addition, 
of these 10, four of them stated that they had at least one damaged IUID in question 7.  If 
these 10 participants answered question 2 in error, which is indicated by their later 
answers, then the number of participants who had IUID markings with damage would 
increase to 27 (71%).  Additionally, 8 of the 21 participants that noted no damage also 
stated that the perspective weapons were not issued for use.  The data shows that that no 
more than 24 (63%) of the participants had issued arms with IUIDs and of these 24, only 
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3 had answers that consistently indicated no damage. Therefore, the percentage of 
participants with issued weapons having some damaged IUIDs is likely closer to 87.5%.  
Even without considering unissued vs. issued weapons, the thesis group considers it 
alarming that 45%-71% of the armories have damaged IUIDs.   
 







Figure 34. Percentage of UID Marked Showing Physical Damage 
Question 3:  What seems to be the cause of the physical damage? 
The survey indicates wear and tear, and tampering as the two identifiable causes 
of physical damage.  Of the armories surveyed, 50% stated that the cause of physical 
damage to IUID was from wear and tear, while 11% stated that damage to IUID was 
from physical tampering (Figure 35).  This may indicate that further knowledge and 
training on UID technology is needed for the end users within the Marine Corps.  This 
knowledge may lead to a reduction in damage caused by tampering and wear and tear.  A 
significant 39% of armories surveyed indicated that there was no damage.  Of the 
undamaged IUID marked weapons (Figure 36), 73% of the armories noted that the 
weapons had not been issued.  This leads the thesis team to believe that when the 
weapons are issued, the percentage of weapons with damaged IUID tags will increase 
significantly.  
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Figure 36. No IUID Damage Breakout 
Question 4:  How long does it take for IUID to sustain damage from initial 
weapons issue? 
Of the participants in our survey 14 (38%) indicated that IUID could have 
possibly sustained damage anywhere between 1 to 12 months after initial weapons issue.  
However, 24 (62%) stated that it was unknown how long it took for IUID damage to 
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occur.  It is difficult to determine how durable the IUID tags are based on the times 
reported.  This is because usage of assets at each armory differs.  Some armories may 
expose their weapons to more rigorous training environments than other armories.  In 
addition, armories may issue their IUID labeled assets at different frequency levels.  
Follow on studies with IUID labels should be done comparing armories with similar 
issuing patterns and training packages.  This may result in data that will lead to 
conclusions that are more decisive on the durability of IUID labels.  Figure 37 gives the 














Unknown 1-2.5 3-5.5 6-7.5 8-10 11-12
Months
HOW LONG IT TAKES FOR IUID TO SUSTAIN DAMAGE
 
Figure 37. IUID Sustain Damage Time Intervals 
Question 5:  What type of physical damage is visible? 
When asked what type of physical damage was most visible, 49% stated peeling, 
41% stated scratching, and 10% stated other (Figure 38).  Several of the participants in 
the 10% other category, mentioned that there were IUID labels that fell completely off 
the weapon.  Falling off and peeling damage suggests that there are engineering issues 
with the adhesiveness of the IUID labels.  The scratching damage to the IUID labels, 
most likely occurred from normal usage or possible tampering.  During the survey, the 
thesis team noted that there were two different types of IUID markings (adhesive tape 
and chemical etch) for the same type of small arms asset.  This factor also contributes to 
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the increased variability in durability lengths.  By limiting the types of IUID labels used 
on the assets, the Marine Corps could reduce the variability of the IUIDs label lifespan.  
Managing a smaller number IUID label types could possible reduce replacement cost of 
IUID labels. 
 








Figure 38. Types of Visible Physical Damage 
Question 6:  What IUID reading capability do you currently have? 
When asked what IUID reading capabilities were available for reading IUID tags, 
all armories reported no equipment was available to read IUID tags.  Since the Marine 
Corps armories have no capability to read the tags, it is unknown how well the tags could 
be read before and after damage.  Without scanners, the armories are unable to implement 
inventory procedures for using IUID labels.  Meanwhile the IUID labels are incurring 
substantial damage without knowledge gained from an automated inventory system. 
Question 7:  How many weapons do you currently have with damaged IUID 
and what is your total inventory? 
The final question to all the armories addressed the number of IUID tags with 
damage and their total on hand inventory.  In the survey, summing across the 38 
participating armories, the participants stated that 3,273 weapons out of 12,260 were said 
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to have damage.  This indicates that 26.7 % of the weapons within the armories surveyed 
had damaged IUID tags. Since the participants earlier stated that some of the undamaged 
weapons had not even been issued yet, the damage percentage of IUIDs on issued 
weapons must be even higher. 
3. Additional Survey Comments and Suggestions from Participants 
Several respondents of the survey made comments and suggestions.  Some 
participants stated that they were unaware of the IUID markings on the weapons and 
wanted to know the purpose of such a tag.  This remains consistent with the thesis 
group’s findings on initial contacts with various Marine Corp armory personnel.  Others 
wanted to know if all the weapons were being fitted with IUID tags and if so would there 
be a scanner available in the near future to capture the information on the tag. 
Two participants who knew what IUIDs were, noticed that the serial number 
stamped on the weapon was different from the one on the IUID tag.  Which brings into 
question: how many weapons are mislabeled and when and where did this occur in the 
tagging process?  In addition, some of the survey participants felt that IUIDs are another 
device that Marines may tamper with.  This raises issues concerning durability and life 
cycle of IUID tags. 
As mentioned previously, there is a serious need to train Marines on UID 
technology.  The training may reduce tampering.  This may increase the lifespan of the 
IUID tags. on small arm assets.  Currently the tags within existing Marine Corps armories 
are showing a lifecycle of less than two years due to durability.  Through training and 
increased awareness of IUID, the high damage rate can potentially be decreased.  The 
survey data further indicates that a there is a high percentage of peeling and scratching on 
the IUID tags.  This may be due to a design flaw that needs to be improved upon.  If 
improvements can be made in the training of Marine Corps personnel and design of IUID 
tags, this could ultimately lead to a decrease in MDT.  This will increase operational 
availability of IUID tags on small arm assets.  As a result, IUID could improve the 
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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS 
In order to make UID successful in the Marine Corps, several changes must be 
made.  The flow of weapons to and from MCLB Albany could affect the readiness at 
supporting units.  At the same time, delays in GCSS-MC prevents logistic sections 
beyond the armory from fully benefiting from Marine Corps armories use of UID. In 
what follows, we make a few suggestions to ensure that controlling small arms inventory 
with IUID tags is an operational success in the Marine Corps and in all of DoD. 
A. LOGCOM 
Currently at FSD Albany, weapons requiring disposal or maintenance are 
received and placed into a database.  All information is manually transcribed into a 
database.  This process creates the possibility of error since the processor must manually 
type each field of information about the item.  We suggested that LOGCOM provide 
individual units with an electronically generated barcode for each asset that does not have 
an IUID.  The barcode could be emailed by LOGCOM and printed by the using unit.  
This will improve the shipping process for assets shipped from using units to LOGCOM. 
Once the asset is delivered to LOGCOM, the barcode sheet on the outside of the 
container can be used to verify the receipt of the shipment.  This will allow the shipment 
to be properly received and stored away, if time does not allow the container to be 
opened and completely inventoried on receipt.  The barcode sheet in or on the box can be 
used once the shipment is ready for processing.  If the barcode sheet on the outside is 
damaged or lost, the copy inside can be used instead.  Using barcodes and scanners to 
transcribe the information significantly reduces processing time and transcription errors. 
The maintenance support provided by LOGCOM is shared by MCLB Barstow, 
California and MCLB Albany, Georgia.  The workload is decided by a variety of factors, 
but the primary driver is the geographical location of the supported units (i.e., West Coast 
units are generally supported by MCLB Barstow and East coast units by MCLB Albany).  
We recommend that further studies be performed to compare the units supported by 
 84
LOGCOM.  The transportation cycle time, manpower and labor cost are some of the 
factors that should be considered.  These factors should be evaluated to reveal how much 
work each depot facility should handle based on its capacity.  LOGCOM should be 
informed when to shift maintenance work to another depot facility based on workload 
capability.  As a result, the capacity of each depot facility would be used more efficiently. 
B. HEADQUARTERS MARINE CORPS, INSTALLATIONS AND 
LOGISTICS 
The Marine Corps currently funds the manpower of the logistics processors at 
NWSC Crane, who input the data received from the Marine Corps depots and using units.  
This cost is approximately $650,000 annually.  Once NWSC Crane has implemented 
their real time system, the processing time for transcribing data should decrease, which 
should immediately require less manpower.  This is because the supporting units would 
input the data online.  The system will reject invalid data information, which would 
reduce errors and reduce process time by preventing NWSC Crane staff from contacting 
units concerning submitted errors.  Key personnel at NWSC Crane believe it will take 
several months to over a year to reduce manpower under the real time data system.  Head 
Quarters Marine Corps, Installations and Logistics may want to evaluate the efficiency of 
the real time system at NWSC Crane to see if manpower and funding can be reduced. 
The Master Data Repository at the Logistics Capability Center in MCLB Albany 
captures and consolidates the information sent to NWSC Crane from the using units and 
depots.  With management, the Master Data Repository database is capable of 
accomplishing what the small arms registry at NWSC Crane does.  In addition, it may be 
worthwhile for the Marine Corps to verify if the Master Data Repository could enhance 
or replace the work currently being performed by NWSC Crane.  
C. ARMORY 
Basic knowledge about IUID should be provided to all armory personnel.  This 
training will reduce physical damage to IUID tags, as well as any possible damage that 
might occur due to tampering.  Based on our research we believe the durability of current 
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tags requires improvement.  Armories should track how IUID tags are damaged to 
identify the causes of damage.  Engineers could use this data to redesign current IUID 
tags and develop a better method for marking small arms assets.  In order for individual 
armories to be successful with an IUID system, the thesis group believes the following 
would have to occur: 
• All of the serialized armory assets within Marine Corps would require IUID 
markings.  This would be accomplished by having all legacy assets pass 
through a maintenance depot to be marked.  However, this would be 
extremely difficult and would either interrupt training and operations at the 
individual units and or the maintenance depot.  
• Armories would also have to maintain the capability to remark damaged 
IUIDs to prevent serious interruptions to inventory and issuing procedures. 
Marine Corps leadership will be very reluctant to release armory assets to the 
maintenance depot for remarking if there are no functional problems with the asset.  This 
is because training and readiness is more important to Marine Corps leader than 
improved processing times within the armory.  Therefore, each armory could be required 
to mark each legacy asset within the armory and upload the IUID information into the 
UID registry.  This would require each armory to have the capability and training to mark 
each serialized asset.  Supplying the training and equipment to each armory may be 
financially challenging. 
D. MARINE CORPS 
The Marine Corps began investing in GCSS-MC in 2003 when it was innovative 
and prominent.  GCSS-MC is the system that will replace legacy logistic systems and 
incorporate IUID fields. This will allow the transfer of information on IUID tag assets 
and linkage to the DoD UID Registry.  In 2008, they are continuing to invest in the 
program.  The Marine Corps will adhere to contractual agreements ascertained during the 
GCSS-MC acquisition process.  By doing this the Marine Corps will accept the 
technology obtained in 2005 that will be implemented in 2010 (when block 1 of GCSS-
MC is actually implemented).  To avoid obtaining yesterday’s technology tomorrow, the 
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Marine Corps will have to invest more funds to upgrade the GCSS-MC program that is 
already behind schedule.  Due to the constant improvements in technology, current 
technology looses its value at a much greater rate.  Therefore, GCSS-MC is loosing its 
value at a much greater rate.  Block 1 of GCSS-MC will not be available to the end user 
until 2010. (This is the earliest possible time.)  GCSS-MC’s full implementation dates for 
blocks 2 and 3 are still unknown.  The Marine Corps is unable to gain system integration 
knowledge each year GCSS-MC is not available to the end user.  Logistical and 
operational knowledge will also be un-obtained with each delay of a GCSS-MC.  GCSS-
MC is the medium of exchange that will enable IUID usage in the Marine Corps.  Thus, 
implementation of IUID throughout the Marine Corps depends on GCSS-MC’s success.  
Therefore, system integration, logistic, and operational knowledge will be delayed on 
IUID also.  As a result, UID technology organic to the Marine Corps is devalued, with 
each day GCSS-MC is not up and running.  This is due to a lack of user knowledge about 
the system from non usage and rapid improvements in technology.  Due to these issues, 
we recommend that GCSS-MC be enabled with full IUID capability and implemented as 
soon as possible in order to obtain the benefits of IUID.  
Based on this and other studies, we believe that the durability problems with IUID 
tags may replicate themselves throughout the Marine Corps or in other military branches.  
Leaders in the IUID industry should develop a tag that withstands the rigors of Marine 
Corps usage.  We suggest that the Marine Corps become the proponents of this change, in 
order to improve the durability of the IUID tags used by the Marine Corps. 
E. SUMMARY 
The DoD definition of IUID includes the identity of a marked asset throughout its 
lifecycle.  A sophisticated data system within the Marine Corps and other services is 
needed to manage all IUID marked assets to capture lifecycle data.  The cost of a 
complete DoD IUID system is tied to the cost of GCSS-MC, because it should 
incorporate IUID fields.  The cost of GCSS-MC block 1 is currently at 442 million 
dollars (GAO, 2008).  It does not include capabilities that will meet the expectations of 
the DoD Concept of Operations.  It is not known in which block of GCSS–MC the 
 87
capabilities will meet the requirements of the DoD’s Concept of Operations.  It is 
recommended based on the research done and information acquired that the Marine 
Corps continue to pursue business system modernization based on their needs.  The 
vision and concept of operation for UID by the DoD should be reevaluated.  The 
revamping of the vision should include considerable input from leadership within the 
military branches who will recoup the benefits of the system. 
Based on existing studies and the thesis team’s survey results, it is concluded that 
there are engineering concerns involving the durability of IUID tags.  Currently, due to 
the lack IUID scanners, it is unknown whether there are further issues concerning IUID 
tags and processing assets within Marine Corps armories. 
When RFID was compared to IUID in the thesis, RFID was shown to be more 
suitable for tagging small arm assets.  However, durability issues remain for both IUID 
and RFID tagging of small arms.  Additional studies should be done on RFID tag and 
IUID tag durability with small arm assets.  A combination of the both RFID and IUID 
technologies could produce a system that is better than using them separately.  
Investigation of this possible solution should also be a follow on study. 
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APPENDIX 
UID physical condition Survey on weapons in Marine Corps Armory 
The following is an informal survey to be used by students’ of the Naval Postgraduate 
School in Monterey, CA, who are in no way affiliated with IUID manufacturing or 
retailing of any products in this particular industry.  The results of the survey will be used 




1. On what type of weapons are UID currently marked on?  When did you start 
receiving weapons with IUID? 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
2.  Are UID on currently marked assets showing physical damage? 
 
  Yes    No 
 
3.  What seems to be the cause of the physical damage?  (e.g., wear & tear, 
tampering, asset abuse or unknown)    
_____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
4. How long does it take for IUID to sustain damage from initial weapon issue? 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 










7. How many weapons do you currently have with damaged IUID and what is your 
total inventory? 
 
We appreciate your cooperation.  Please return this survey to rrharris@nps.edu. 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 97
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
3. Geraldo Ferrer 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
4. Jane L. Zimmerman 
COMFISC 
Washington Navy Yard, DC 
 




6. Susan Heath 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
